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INTRODUCTION 
 
   
According to the 2004 Revision of the United Nations (2005) the population at the 
global level continues to increase. While the size of the population in more developed regions 
is hardly changing, virtually all population growth is occurring in the less developed regions. 
Rapid population growth characterizes in particular the group of 50 least developed countries. 
If the global human population continues to expand in the same tempo (i.e. doubled in 39 
years time), there will simply not be enough natural resources on our planet (Schmuck & 
Schultz,  2002).  Moreover,  the  lifestyles  of  many  people  in  almost  all  countries  are  not 
sustainable. Overconsumption in the Northern hemisphere of our planet cannot be continued 
indefinitely. If all people were to adopt the lifestyle of the most industrialized countries, we 
would need several planets to satisfy these needs (Gardner & Sampat, 1999).  For this reason, 
taking the steps necessary to move toward sustainable development is not one option among 
many. It is the only option (Schmuck & Schultz, 2002). Sustainability refers to uses of natural 
resources in such a way that the earth can continue to meet the needs of all people, all life, and 
future generations. 
 
In  the  achievement  of  a  sustainable  future,  fostering  ‘social’  participation  will  be 
society’s major concern. Like in the profit sector, in the non-profit (or governmental) sector 
marketing can be an effective tool in getting people to ‘cooperate’. Besides education and 
law, marketing indeed can be a strategic tool to manage cooperative behavior (Rotschild, 
1999).  Marketing  attempts  to  manage  behavior  by  offering  reinforcing  incentives  and/or 
consequences that invite voluntary cooperation (Rotschild, 1999). Contrary to marketing, law 
involves the use of coercion to achieve cooperation in a non-voluntary manner or to threaten 
with punishment for non-compliance (e.g., penalties for littering); whereas education refers to 
messages that attempt to inform and/or persuade targets to cooperate voluntary, but do not 
provide immediate reward or punishment.  
 
Only  providing  information  and  convincing  arguments,  which  make  the  consumer 
think and evaluate his options (i.e. education), can definitely change opinions (Andreasen, 
1995;  Fishbein  &  Ajzen,  1975).  This  theoretical  orientation  is  at  the  base  of  traditional 
awareness raising or sensibilization campaigns. For highly involving decisions (e.g., a family  
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considering a switch to alternative energy for heating their house), this approach may be the 
most  suitable  (Osterhuis,  1997).  Unfortunately,  a  variety  of  studies  have  established  that 
enhancing knowledge and creating supportive attitudes by means of information-intensive 
campaigns often has little or no impact upon behavior (McKenzie-Mohr, 2000). We know 
that human beings like to reason, but are not always rational. Especially (seemingly) low 
involving decisions (e.g., buying a ‘green’ detergent) are often the result of emotional and/or 
heuristic processing. The majority of sustainable and cooperative behaviors are very simple 
behaviors,  conducted  several  times  per  day  (e.g.,  garbage  disposal),  and  often  in  time 
pressured  and  distracted  circumstances  (e.g.,  deciding  to  donate  at  the  entrance  of  the 
supermarket). These routine decisions will not be extensively deliberated, and even if some 
consumers  would  do  so,  it  would  be  easy  for  them  to  find  reasons  not  to  opt  for  the 
cooperative alternative. Self-interest (e.g., saving money) will always be more salient than the 
collective interest (see Warlop, Smeesters, & Vanden Abeele, 2000).  
 
In  sum,  many  social  marketers  like  to  see  the  cooperative  consumer  as  a  rational 
decision maker who’s knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs can be influenced by (persuasive) 
messages in favor of cooperative behavior (e.g. Andreasen, 1995; Rasmuson et al., 1988; 
Wiener  &  Doescher,  1991).  In  this  dissertation,  however,  we  will  consider  the  ‘social’ 
consumer  as being (at least partly) driven by heuristic processing or mental shortcuts.  In 
addition,  we  will  investigate  whether  subtle  cues  in  the  environment  can  be  applied  to 
increase consumers’ likelihood of making a ‘prosocial’ choice. 
 
Overview of Manuscripts in the (Social) Marketing Mix 
 
The marketing of any product, tangible or abstract, benefits from the preparation of a 
marketing  plan,  usually  based  on  the  time-honored  four  P’s:  product,  price,  place,  and 
promotion. The formula by which the marketer allocates resources to each of the four P’s is 
called the marketing mix (Kotler, Armstrong, Saunders, & Wong, 1999). In theory, the firm 
or non-profit organization that creates the optimum marketing mix should emerge as the most 
competitive one in the marketplace. Fine (1990) suggests extending the 4P’s model with three 
more P’s: producer (marketer or source of the promotion), purchaser (those to whom it must 
appeal),  and  probing  (consumer  research).  This  expanded  model  provides  the  framework 
needed to prepare an effective plan and achieve the optimum marketing mix. Below in Table  
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0.1, we illustrate how Fine’s 7P’s model (1990) can be applied to a social marketing program 
that aims to encourage condom use among teenagers.  
 
Table 0.1 
7P’s Marketing Mix to Encourage Condom Use among Teenagers 
7P’s  Example 
Potential purchasers and their needs  Teenagers who just want to have sex and be ‘cool’ 
Product to fill the teenagers’ needs  Handy wrapped condoms with pictures of rock stars & different flavors 
Price to obtain product  Monetary price but also the embarrassment while purchasing or using one  
Availability at the best Place &Time 
In private restrooms at schools & bars /  Handy wrapped to lower the 
threshold of actually using one 
Promotional tool  Advertisements with the same rock stars 
Producer or source of the message  The government 
Probing to evaluate campaign  Research in schools & HIV-aids statistics 
 
 
In this doctoral dissertation we present three different manuscripts. Each manuscript 
tackles one specific ‘cooperation’ problem and is written so that it can be read independently 
of the other manuscripts. Here, we give a brief overview of the different manuscripts and try 
to highlight for each manuscript where it fits into the (social) marketing mix.  
 
The first manuscript examines the role of adding a product (or exchange) to a donation 
request. The findings suggest that because donors are already buying something ‘immaterial’ 
(e.g., a warm glow), we do not need to offer them an additional material good (e.g., a candle). 
Instead, we should offer them an indication of a socially acceptable donation price to make 
the transaction as smooth as possible. In the second manuscript we study how people’s need 
for food affects people’s need for money and vice versa. In fact we take a closer look at the 
ideal circumstances to approach people with a donation request. By showing the reciprocal 
association between the incentive value of food and money, the paper implies that we should 
not ask people to donate on an empty stomach (time) or when shopping while the odor of 
freshly  baked  cookies  fills  the  corridor  (place).  The  final  manuscript  investigates  a 
promotional tool that can be applied by non-profit organizations and commercial marketers to 
amplify compliance rates. Four studies demonstrate that ‘mere agreeing’ propositions have 
the ability to provoke cooperative behavior by nourishing consumers’ need to help similar 
people.  
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MANUSCRIPT I: PRODUCT AND PRICE 
 
For  many  charitable  organizations  soliciting  adequate  resources  to  carry  out  their 
mandates is a continuing struggle. Confronted with a growing need for their services, fierce 
competitions from other charities and shrinking support from government agencies, charities 
may consult marketers for help in developing effective fundraising (Bendapudi, Singh, & 
Bendapudi, 1996). Although there is not much literature or data collection on fund-raising 
strategies, there is a great deal of ‘common’ knowledge about the best fund-raising practices. 
For instance, Charities and NGO’s are known to bundle donation requests with the offering of 
a (often near-worthless) product, like a plastic key chain, a pencil, or a set of postcards that 
you will never use. Doing so, they present the donation request as an exchange transaction. 
Although little research has investigated the usefulness of this practice, Holmes, Miller, and 
Lerner (2002) suggest that adding some return utility to a donation may make donating more 
attractive, even if the resulting utility is minimal or even illusionary.  
 
In this paper, we propose and test an alternative explanation for why consumers would 
react positively to donation requests that are framed as the sale of a product. One of the 
reasons why a priced exchange may enhance compliance is that it signals an anchor or a 
reference price to which potential donors can compare candidate contributions. As long as this 
price  is  appropriate  and  fair,  it  gives  potential  donors  a  comfortable  cue  of  an  expected 
donation amount. In a simple donation setting, on the other hand, we think that people lack an 
anchor that informs them on an acceptable donation amount, and thus often decide not to 
donate at all. 
 
Three studies support the idea that adding exchange to charity can provide potential 
donors with an anchor or expected donation ‘price’. In Study 1, overall, participants were 
more  likely  to  donate  when  offered  an  exchange  than  when  no  exchange  was  presented. 
Intriguingly,  within  the  exchange  conditions,  participants  appeared  more  likely  to  donate 
when they first had to estimate the value of the exchange than when they first had to indicate 
whether they would donate or not. On the contrary, in the simple donation setting, people 
lacked  a  reference  price;  many  overestimated  the  cost  of  giving  and  thus  decided  not  to 
donate.  In  Study  2,  we  found  that  the  compliance  rate  in  exchange  conditions  critically 
depends on the price of the token. If the token price was sufficiently low, compliance with a 
donation request increased relative to a simple donation situation. If the token price was rather  
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high, compliance with a donation request did not significantly change relative to a simple 
donation situation. Finally, Study 3 showed that, as expected by an anchoring explanation, a 
donation request that explicitly asked for a low amount generated more compliance than a 
simple donation request. Just as an exchange can ‘help or hurt’ depending on its price, a 
combined use of simple donations and specified contribution amounts can similarly influence 
compliance rates. 
 
MANUSCRIPT II: TIME AND PLACE 
 
One of the strongest motivations for people living in modern societies is the desire to 
obtain  money,  but  for  most  of  man’s  history  ‘resources’  have  connoted  food  rather  than 
money (Diamond, 1997). It seems reasonable then to propose that people’s desire for money 
is a modern derivative of their evolved desire for food.   
 
In  three  studies  we  show  that  desire  for  caloric  resources  increases  the  desire  for 
financial resources and vice versa. In Study 1, hungry participants were less likely to donate 
to charity than satiated participants. In Study 2, an olfactory food cue, known to increase the 
desire  to  eat,  made  participants  offer  less  money  in  a  ‘give  some  game’  compared  to 
participants in a room free of scent. In Study 3, the respondents’ desire for money affected the 
amount  of  M&Ms  eaten  in  a  subsequent  taste  test,  but  only  for  dietary-unrestrained 
participants.   
 
We discuss our findings in the light of primary and secondary reinforcers and recent 
neurological insights that suggest a common pathway to the processing of food and monetary 
rewards. 
 
MANUSCRIPT III: PROMOTION  
   
Compliance refers to a particular response – acquiescence – to a particular kind of 
communication – a request. The request may be explicit, as in the direct solicitation of funds 
in a door-to-door campaign for charitable donations, or it may be implicit, as in a real estate 
agent who promotes the qualities of an apartment without directly asking to buy one. But in 
all cases, the target of the communication recognizes that he or she is expected to respond in a 
desired way. For most of us, few days pass without coming across someone who wants us to  
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buy a product, to visit a website, to respond to a questionnaire, to sign a petition, or help 
someone in need. In all sort domains, people try to influence other people; people want other 
people to comply with a request. In this paper, we will apply the social and interpersonal 
value of hypothesis-consistent testing (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995) to boost compliance rates 
in marketing interactions.  
 
We  suggest  that  triggering  agreement  from  interviewees  may  increase  compliance 
with a subsequent request from the interviewer. The increased compliance may be the result 
of an increased perceived similarity between interviewer and interviewee (e.g., Burger et al., 
2004). In addition, we investigate whether the proposed influence of ‘mere agreeing’ indeed 
can be considered as a tool that boosts compliance as the result of subtle and largely heuristic 
processing. Finally, to provide greater external validity for the effect, we replicate our lab 
findings in a sample of the general population in the context of a market research telephone 
survey.  
 
In  four  studies  we  investigate  whether  prior  agreement  makes  interviewers  more 
willing to help their interviewer afterwards. In Study 1, we found that ‘agreeing’ respondents 
perceived the interviewer or the person posing the propositions, as being more similar to them 
than ‘disagreeing’ or ‘neutral’ respondents. Study 2 showed that the more participants agreed 
on a set of propositions, the more they were willing to help ‘their interviewer’ afterwards. 
This effect was mediated by the perceived similarity with the interviewer. In Study 3, we 
suggest that the effect of mere agreeing influences cooperative behavior as the result of a 
well-learned script that is automatically applied when meeting with ‘similar’ people. Efforts 
to debias the effect led respondents to correct for this influence: after notifying participants of 
the former ‘mere agreeing’ (i.e. debiasing tool) the effect of mere agreeing on compliance 
disappeared. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the external validity of our findings. Particularly, 
we replicated the effect of mere agreeing on the willingness to cooperate in the setting of a 
market research telephone survey.  
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MANUSCRIPT I 
 
ADDING EXCHANGE TO CHARITY:  








Charities often request donations while offering a near-worthless token, like a key 
chain, in exchange. Little research has examined whether such ‘exchange’ requests are met 
with higher compliance rates than simply asking people to donate. Our studies suggest that in 
simple  donation  settings  people  may  have  difficulties  in  estimating  a  socially  acceptable 
donation amount and therefore prefer opportunities that provide them with an anchor price. 
The value of a material good in a donation setting can play this anchoring role and signal a 
reference price. To the extent that the suggested reference price is low enough, exchange 
requests  lead  to  more  compliance  than  simple  donation  requests.  However,  our  results 
indicate that, when accompanied by specified amounts, simple donation requests result in 
even better compliance rates than exchange requests.  
 
 
                                                 
1 This manuscript is adapted from Briers, B., Pandelaere, M., & Warlop, L. (in press). Adding exchange to 
charity: A reference price explanation. Journal of Economic Psychology. The authors thank Dirk Smeesters and 
all members of the consumer behavior group at the K.U.Leuven for their comments on an earlier version of this 
manuscript. Financial support from grant g.0260.02 of the Fund for Scientific Research - Flanders (Belgium), 
from Belgian Science Policy grant CP01/151, and from Censydiam-Synovate is gratefully acknowledged.  
  




Economists and social psychologists have often attempted to understand charitable 
giving from the supply side of donations: ‘Why should people make sacrifices for others?’  
Recently,  however,  researchers  have  recognized  the  importance  of  considering  also  the 
demand for donations, that is, the fund-raising side of the market. Fund-raising has developed 
into a huge, sophisticated and competitive business (Andreoni, 2006). Although there is not 
much literature or data collection on fund-raising strategies, there is a great deal of ‘common’ 
knowledge  about  the  best  fund-raising  practices.    Intuition  and  some  research  (Holmes, 
Miller,  &  Lerner,  2002) suggest  that  adding  some  return  utility  to  a  donation  may  make 
donating  more  attractive,  even  if  the  resulting  utility  is  minimal  or  even  illusionary.  For 
example, charities and nongovernmental organizations are known to bundle donation requests 
with an often near-worthless exchange, like a plastic key chain, a pencil, or a set of postcards 
that you may never use.  In doing so, they present the donation request as an exchange, or an 
economic transaction.  
 
In this paper, we examine whether and why consumers react positively to donation 
requests that are framed as the sale of a product. We think that one of the reasons why a 
priced exchange may increase compliance is that it signals an anchor or a reference price to 
which  potential  donors  can  compare  candidate  contributions.  As  long  as  this  price  is 
appropriate and fair, it gives potential donors an indication of an expected donation amount 
that is comfortable. In a simple donation setting, on the other hand, we think that people lack 
an anchor that informs  them on an acceptable  donation amount, and therefore they often 
decide not to donate at all. 
 
1.1.1 Exchange as an Alibi 
 
To our knowledge, Holmes et al. (2002) were the first to test why adding exchange to 
charity  can  trigger  more  donors  than  simply  asking  people  to  donate.  They  argue  that  a 
powerful societal norm of self-interest precludes people from behaving altruistically.  In fact, 
even individuals who experience strong feelings of compassion may be hesitant to act on 
those feelings because of this norm.  People think that most other people are mainly driven by  
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self-interest  (Miller  &  Ratner,  1998),  but  in  fact  they  are  more  driven  by  altruism  and 
compassion. As people expect other people to behave selfishly, they are quite surprised to see 
acts of altruism in others (Ratner & Miller, 2001). As a consequence, people prefer self-
interested  behavior  to  avoid  being  exploited  by  self-interested  others,  or  to  avoid  social 
disapproval for being ‘irrational’ (Miller & Ratner, 1998; Miller, 1999).  Even in a completely 
anonymous setting people might still want to obey the norm of self-interest because they have 
internalized the belief that it is the appropriate and rational thing to do (Tyler, Huo, & Lind, 
1999).   
 
Framing  the  donation  as  a  commercial  exchange  may  therefore  provide  potential 
donors a ‘psychological cover’ that enables them to act altruistically (i.e. an excuse for not 
complying with the norm of self-interest). It gives them the opportunity to show their genuine 
compassion, while avoiding the negative feelings associated with violating the norm of self-
interest.  
 
Construing a donation as a transaction has the additional advantage that it can limit the 
implications  for  the  self  of  what  Lerner  (1986)  calls  ‘justice  motive’.  By  responding  to 
appeals for unconditional help, one creates a psychological duty to be helpful to all other 
persons or groups worthy of help in the future: ‘If I help now, I’ll always have to help!’ 
Engaging in a commercial transaction does not generate the same moral commitment.  
 
1.1.2 Exchange as an Anchor 
 
When confronted with a donation request, the potential donor needs not only to decide 
whether or not to give, but also how much to give. Fraser, Hite, and Sauer (1988) suggested 
that potential contributors form an impression of some minimally socially acceptable anchor 
point  to  which  potential  contribution  amounts  are  compared.    Amounts  greater  than  the 
minimum anchor are regarded as generous; Amounts smaller than the minimum are regarded 
as socially unacceptable. However, just like consumers may have difficulties in estimating the 
price of a service due to a lack of a salient cost of goods sold (Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003), 
in a simple donation setting potential donors may also experience difficulties determining 
what would be an  appropriate donation amount. For economic reasons they may  want to 
avoid  too  large  a  contribution,  while  too  small  a  contribution  may  be  perceived  as  
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inappropriate.    Decision  difficulty  often  leads  to  choice  deferral  (Dhar,  1996).  Similarly, 
potential  donors  may  make  no  contribution  at  all  if  determining  the  appropriate  donation 
appears too difficult.   
 
The option to ‘buy something’ instead of just donating may make it easier for potential 
donors to assess the minimally socially acceptable donation amount (cf. Fraser, Hite, & Sauer, 
1988). Indeed, the reference price of the token product may serve as an anchor that is used to 
determine the expected donation amount and thus may influence the decision to donate. This 
would be similar to the finding that first offers serve as anchors and strongly predict final 
settlement prices in a negotiation situation (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001). So, the donation 
price one asks in exchange for a token may provide potential donors with an anchor against 
which contributions can be compared.  
 
Of course, providing people with a donation anchor does not necessarily imply that 
they will feel compelled to donate. Indeed, justice motive theory (Lerner, 1986; Miller, 1977) 
states that helping someone in need should not lower one’s outcomes below a deserved level. 
Clearly, if the token that is offered signals too high a donation amount, people will not donate, 
not even in exchange for a token. In particular, donation requests coupled with ‘overpriced’ 
exchanges may not help or may even decrease compliance rates compared to simple donation 
settings, as people might fear that their own outcomes are at stake. In fact, asking a lot of 
money in exchange for a worthless token might be perceived as unfair. 
 
On the other hand, tokens that are sold in a donation request may signal a donation 
amount that people consider being ‘fair’. First, a low priced token may signal a donation price 
that is lower than the perceived donation price in simple donation settings. Moreover, low 
priced exchanges may legitimize small contributions and, therefore, render most excuses for 
noncompliance  (e.g.,  ‘We  can’t  afford  to  help.’)  inappropriate  and  make  refusal  socially 
embarrassing. This assumption is supported by Cialdini and Schroeder’s (1976) finding that, 
in a door-to-door charity drive, a reminder to potential donors that ‘even a penny will help’, 
significantly increased the number of donations without affecting their average size. They 
argued that people are more likely to donate in this case because of self-presentation concerns 
(see  also Brockner, Guzzi, Kane,  Levine,  & Shaplen, 1984; Reeves, Macolini, & Martin, 
1987; Reingen, 1978).  
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Finally,  if  the  presence  of  an  anchor  or  reference  price  is  an  important  factor  in 
triggering donations, the association of simple donations and fixed prices should cause similar 
effects. That is, compliance rates in a simple donation setting should also be elevated when 
giving  potential  donors  the  opportunity  to  donate  a  specified  small  amount.  Requesting 
specific  large  donation  amounts,  on  the  other  hand,  should  decrease  the  probability  of 
compliance. In that context, Schwarzwald, Bizman and Raz (1983) already showed that in 
combination with the foot-in-the-door paradigm donation sizes can be elevated by requesting 
specified amounts. Still, the foot-in-the-door technique is a gradual persuasion technique in 
which an initial, modest request is followed by a subsequent, larger request.  In our research, 
however, we want to test whether compliance rates can be enlarged by requesting specified 
amounts, without the aid of a proceeding modest request.   
 
1.1.3 Empirical Research 
 
The main goal of this research was to test an anchoring mechanism for the role of 
adding exchange to charity. We expected more people to donate in exchange for a product 
compared to a simple donation condition. However, we expected this effect of exchange to be 
moderated by its price. Indeed, a low token price may urge people to donate as it provides 
them with a comfortable indication of the expected amount; that is the signal of a ‘fair’ price. 
On the other hand, an overpriced token or too high an anchor may not help or may even 
inhibit people from donating. Further, if an exchange can ‘help or hurt’ depending on its 
price, we hypothesize that specifying contribution amounts in the context of simple donations 
should bring about compliance rates that are comparable to those in exchange settings.  
 
1.2 STUDY 1 
 
 
In the first study, we explored the effect of an exchange on the incidence and amount 
of donations. We controlled for the frivolous or functional nature of the token exchange, 
because this has been found to make a difference in the context of bundling charity donations 
to the purchase of a product (e.g., for every package of its coffee sold during the Christmas 
Holidays,  Douwe  Egberts®  recently  donated  one  serving  of  coffee  to  the  homeless  in 
Belgium). In this context Strahilevitz and Myers (1998) found that charity incentives were  
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more effective in promoting frivolous products than practical products. They suggested that 
donations  complement  or  neutralize  the  negative  feelings  associated  with  indulging  in 
frivolous consumer behavior (see also Kivetz & Simonson, 2002). By means of a pre-test we 
obtained  two  products  that  differ  significantly  in  frivolity,  but  score  equally  on  a 
functionality-scale: regular and colored staples (both €0.50 real shop value).  
 
To explore our prediction that an exchange might signal an anchor or reference price 
that may induce people to donate, we asked participants to estimate the value of the offered 
products either before or after the donation decision.  If people are more likely to donate when 
their attention is first drawn to the product value, this would yield further support for our 
assumption that the value of the product in the exchange serves as an anchor that guides 






A  total  of  144  volunteer  undergraduate  economics  students  participated  in  this 
scenario study which was part of a written questionnaire, conducted in groups of about 20 
people.  
 
1.2.1.2 Materials and procedure 
 
The  participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  three  experimental  conditions. 
They were asked to donate to a charity without a product being offered (simple donation), 
donate in exchange for the ‘functional’ staples (practical exchange), or donate in exchange for 
the ‘frivolous’ staples (frivolous exchange). The charity used in the scenario was described as 
follows:  ‘An  organization  that  delivers  basic  medicine  for  the  treatment  of  diseases  as 
malaria,  tuberculosis,  and  African  trypanosomiasis  (sleeping  sickness)  in  parts  of  Africa, 
Asia, & Latin-America’.  In the exchange conditions, a picture of the staples accompanied the 
appeal. Participants had to indicate whether or not they would be willing to donate and how 
much.   
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In the exchange conditions, we also asked participants to estimate the shop value of 
the product either before or after the donation request. As the shop value of a product may 
somehow differ from the value participants think its worth to them on that moment in time, 
we added a third exchange condition in which  we asked participants before the donation 
request how much they would pay for the product if they would have the chance to buy it 
‘here and now, under these circumstances’. The donation request and the value estimation 
were always presented on different sheets of paper. 
 
In  all,  then,  our  design  consisted  of  1  simple  donation  condition  and  6  exchange 
conditions.  The  latter  represented  a  2  (type  of  product:  functional  vs.  frivolous)  by  3 
(combination  of  questions:  (1)  donation  request  before  shop  value,  (2)  shop  value  before 




The frivolous versus functional nature of the token did not significantly affect our 
results.  We  therefore  collapse  over  this  factor  in  our  analysis.  This  leaves  three  different 
conditions in which participants where offered an exchange: donation request before shop 
value (Exchange 1), shop value before donation request (Exchange 2), and ‘here&now-value’ 
before  donation  request  (Exchange  3).  Together  with  the  simple  donation  condition 
(Donation), this leads to four different experimental conditions (see Table 1 for the different 
cells). 
 
1.2.2.1 Compliance probability 
 
 A logistic regression with donation (yes versus no) as the criterion, and experimental 
condition as the categorical predictor (with 4 levels), revealed that compliance varied across 
the  experimental  conditions,  LR  χ²(3)  =  14.81,  p  =  .002  (see  Table  1).  In  line  with  our 
hypothesis, planned contrasts revealed that the compliance rate was significantly higher in the 
conditions where participants had to estimate the value first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3) than 
in the conditions where participants had to decide whether or not to donate first (Donation & 
Exchange  1),  LR  χ²(1)  =  12.65,  p  =  .0004.  Moreover,  the  compliance  rate  was  not 
significantly higher in the exchange condition in which the donation question was asked first  
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(Exchange  1)  than  in  the  simple  donation  condition  (Donation),  LR  χ²(1)  <  1,  n.s.  The 
compliance rate was significantly higher in the exchange conditions in which a value question 
was asked first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3) than in the exchange condition in which the 
donation question was asked first (Exchange 1), LR χ²(1) = 5.58, p = .02. 
 
 
Table 1.1   
Donation Rate and Mean Amount Donated as a Function of Experimental Condition  
 
  Simple Donation  Exchange 
    1  2  3 
First question  Donation
a 








(n = 35) 
Donation after ‘Here 
& Now’ valuation 
(n = 29) 
Donation rate  46%  56%  80%  80% 
Non zero mean amount   € 12.2  € 4.9  € 5.1  € 4.1 
Total revenue, n = 100  €561.2  €274.4  €408  €328 
Note. 
aThe donation question was the only question in this condition. 
 
 
In an additional analysis of the exchange conditions we also included the value that 
participants estimated. This analysis revealed a marginally significant interaction between the 
estimated value and when the value questions were asked, LR χ²(1) = 3.27; p = .071: When 
participants had to estimate the value first (Exchange 2 & Exchange 3), the donation intention 
decreased as the estimated value increased; when participants received the donation question 
first (Exchange 1), the estimated value had no effect on the compliance rate.  
 
1.2.2.2 Contribution revenues 
 
 Since  within-condition  donations  were  not  normally  distributed,  we  analyzed  the 
donation amounts of the participants who made contributions non-parametrically (N = 89; two 
outliers were excluded from analysis using ± 3 SD). We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis Test 
with  amount  as  the  dependent  variable  and  experimental  condition  (4  levels)  as  the 
independent variable. A main effect of experimental condition was obtained, χ²(3) = 12.82; p 
= .005. Subjects in the simple donation condition donated significantly more, χ²(1) = 11.27; p 
= .001, than those in the exchange conditions.   
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In  an  additional  analysis  of  the  contributions  in  the  exchange  conditions  (N  =  67 
contributors), we again included the estimated value (i.e. shop value or ‘here & now’ value 
dependent on the condition; logarithmic transformed) as a covariate. This ANCOVA revealed 
a significant positive effect of the estimated value on the contribution size, F(1, 63) = 31.50, p 
< .0001: The higher contributors estimated the product value, the more they contributed. 
 
1.2.3 Discussion   
 
Overall, participants were more likely to donate when offered an exchange than when 
no  exchange  was  presented.  Intriguingly,  within  the  exchange  conditions,  participants 
appeared more likely to donate when they first had to estimate the value of the exchange than 
when they first had to indicate whether they would donate or not. In addition, in the exchange 
conditions  where  participants  had  to  estimate  the  value  first,  the  likelihood  of  donation 
decreased as the estimated value went up. In the exchange condition where participants first 
had to decide whether or not to donate, the estimated value was not related to the outcome of 
the donation decision. 
 
Possibly,  in  a  donation  situation,  people  try  to  construct  some  minimally  socially 
acceptable anchor point against which candidate contribution amounts are compared. As the 
magnitude of that lower anchor increases, the magnitude of the contribution will increase, but 
the probability of compliance will decrease (cf. Fraser et al. 1988). Indeed, the higher our 
participants estimated the value, the less likely they were to comply with the donation request, 
but the more money they were planning to donate if they did decide to donate. 
 
Asking participants to estimate the value of the product before they decided to donate 
may have cued a ‘donation anchor’. The product value (shop value or the value participants 
think it is worth to them on that very moment), probably functioned as a reference price and 
gave people an indication of the expected donation amount. In addition, as the product was 
rather inexpensive, the donation anchor was for most participants sufficiently low to persuade 
them to donate. In the simple donation condition, participants may not only have had more 
difficulty to construct a donation anchor, they also may have constructed a more elevated 
donation anchor. Two pieces of evidence support this assumption. First, the variance of the 
donation amount (logarithmic transformed) was much higher in the simple donation condition  
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(SD = .34) than in the exchange conditions (SD = .22): F(1, 87) = 7.21, p = .009 (Levene’s 
Test for Equality of Variances). Second, for the donating participants, donation amount was 
significantly higher in the simple donation condition than in the exchange conditions. In fact, 
the mean amount donated in the simple donation condition was rather elevated (M = €12.2). 
Many participants in the simple donation condition presumably overestimated the ‘cost’ of 
donating,  and  hence  decided  not  to  donate.  This  is  consistent  with  the  assumption  that 
participants  in  the  simple  donation  condition  lack  an  anchor  that  informs  them  about  an 
acceptable donation amount. In the exchange condition, such an anchor is provided by the 
shop value or ‘here&now’ value (whichever is measured) of the product that is offered in 
exchange for the donation.  
 
One potential alternative explanation for the findings in Study 1 deserves mention. 
The fact that people donate more easily when they first have to estimate the product value, 
may  be  similar  to  a  foot-in-the-door  effect.  The  foot-in-the-door  paradigm  suggests  that 
compliance breeds compliance. Having agreed to an initial request, individuals infer that they 
are helpful and cooperative. When subsequently confronted with a second and larger request, 
people are more likely to comply so as to maintain a consistent self-image. In our experiment, 
the value estimation question might have functioned as the first modest request, which was 
then followed by the second and larger donation request. Although we doubt the validity of 
this alternative explanation because answering a value question is hardly comparable to a 
compliance request, we try to rule it out by collecting additional data in Study 2.  
 
1.3 STUDY 2 
 
 
Study 2 provides a more critical test of our hypothesis that people donate more easily 
when their attention is drawn to a low product value. In addition, we also test whether an 
exchange can be ‘overpriced’ and consequently, can inhibit people from donating compared 
to a simple donation baseline condition. Finally, in the current study, participants have to 
make a real donation decision, rather than a decision in a scenario. That is, if they decide to 
donate, they actually have to give some money. 
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As the type of product did not matter in Study 1, we use only one product (colored 
paperclips; € 0.50 real shop value) in the exchange condition. To test our hypothesis, we 
manipulate the value of the paperclips (€3 vs. €0.50) in the donation request. We hypothesize 
that the €0.50 paperclips will signal a ‘fair’ donation price, a socially acceptable anchor which 
will persuade people to donate. The €3 paperclips, on the other and, can represent too large an 
anchor  that  does  not  induce  but  rather  inhibits  people  to  donate  compared  to  the  simple 






Participants were 184 undergraduates (from several majors), who were paid €7 for 
their participation in a number of unrelated experiments, ending with the current study.  
 
1.3.1.2 Material and procedure 
 
Participants  were  invited  to  the  lab  in  groups  of  at  most  eight  people.  In  a  brief 
introduction they were told that they would participate in a series of unrelated experiments. At 
the end of the session when participants had been paid €7, registered and thanked for their 
participation, they received an envelope with the invitation to donate. They were asked to 
have  a  look  at  it  in  their  cubicle  before  leaving the  room.    The  letter  explained  that  the 
Marketing  Department  had  organized  its  annual  donation  drive,  and  that  all  marketing 
students and experimental participants were being given the chance to make a donation as 
well. The money would go to ‘an organization that delivers basic medicine for Africa, Asia, & 
Latin-America’, as in Study 1.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental conditions: They 
were invited (1) to just donate (simple donation condition), (2) to donate in exchange for 
paperclips without a shop value mentioned (no value exchange condition), (3) to donate in 
exchange for paperclips with a mentioned shop value of €3 (€3-exchange condition), (4) or to 
donate in exchange for paperclips with a mentioned shop value of €0.50 (€0.50-exchange 
condition).  This  shop  value  was  mentioned  between  brackets  after  the  description  of  the  
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offered product. In the exchange conditions, the product (colored paperclips) was included in 
the envelope. Participants were told that they could take the product home when donating 
some money; any amount was said to be appreciated. To make any donation between €0.50 
and 7 € possible, the €7-endowment was paid  in coins of €0.50, €1,  and €2. Finally, all 
participants were asked to close the envelope and leave it in the donation box at the entrance 
of the laboratory. This donation box was used to increase the feeling of anonymity. Donations 




1.3.2.1 Compliance probability 
 
 A logistic regression with donation (yes versus no) as the criterion, and experimental 
condition as the categorical predictor (with 4 levels), confirmed our hypotheses. Compliance 
varied significantly across the experimental conditions, LR χ²(3) = 12.23, p = .007 (see Table 
2). The compliance rate was significantly higher in the €0.50-exchange condition than in the 
simple donation condition, LR χ²(1) = 5.63, p < .02. In contrast, the compliance rate was 
slightly lower in the €3-exchange condition than in the simple donation condition, although 
the difference did not reach significance, LR χ²(1) < 2, n.s. In summary, we found evidence 
for the moderating role of the price of an exchange in triggering potential donors. Price does 
matter; the compliance rate was significantly higher in the €0.50-exchange condition than in 
the €3-exchange condition, LR χ²(1) = 11.05, p = .0009.  
 
Although the compliance rate was slightly more elevated in the no-value exchange 
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Table 1.2 
  Donation Rate and Mean Amount Donated as a Function of Experimental Condition 
  Simple Donation  Exchange  
 
Value of exchange product 
 
 N/A 
(n = 52) 
No Value 
(n = 46) 
€3 
(n = 44) 
€0.5 
(n = 42) 
Donation rate  50%  61%  39%  74% 
Non zero mean amount   € 1.46  € 1.93  € 3.00  € 1.53 
Total revenue given n = 100  €73  €117.7  €117  €113.2 
 
 
1.3.2.2 Contribution revenues 
 
Again, since donations were not normally distributed, a non-parametric analysis was 
applied. We conducted a Kruskal-Wallis Test on the data of the donating participants (N = 
102) with donation amount as the dependent variable and experimental condition (4 levels) as 
the independent variable. The amount donated was affected by the experimental condition, 
χ²(3)  =  16.8,  p  =  .001.  Not  surprisingly,  the  participants  in  the  €3-condition  donated  on 





In this study, the ‘exchange’ effect appears to be dominated by the price of the token. 
In line with Study 1, the €0.50-token signaled a comfortable reference price, leading to an 
elevated compliance rate. However, as the price of the token increased to €3, the compliance 
rate plummeted. For larger donation requests to be effective, they have to be perceived as 
lying within a plausible range for donation (Doob & McLaughlin, 1989).Whereas €3 is often 
used as a real donation price for products offered by NGO’s, many students in this context 
(they had just worked for an hour to receive €7) may not have perceived the €3 as lying 
within a plausible range of acceptance. In line with this assumption, the justice motive theory 
(Lerner, 1986) would suggest that participants thought of €3 as being a threat to their own 
outcomes.   
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Finally,  when  looking  at  the  results  of  Study  2,  the  alternative  foot-in-the-door 
explanation of Study 1 seems to be no longer valid. In Study 2, there was no initial value 
estimation that could have functioned as a first modest request. In that sense, the estimated 
value in Study 1 has the same anchoring function as the mentioned shop value in Study 2: 
Whether participants first have to estimate the product value (Study 1) or whether the value is 
already mentioned, people donate more easily when they are presented with a low product 
value, as opposed to an exchange setting in which no price indication is present.  
 
1.4 STUDY 3 
 
 
In Study 1, some participants in the exchange conditions were asked to estimate the 
value of the product before deciding to donate. This apparently  gave them a comfortable 
reference price, a rather low ‘donation anchor’. In the simple donation condition, on the other 
hand, participants lacked a donation anchor; they had problems in estimating a ‘fair’ price, 
and seemed to construct a more elevated donation anchor.  In Study 2, we found that the 
compliance rate in exchange conditions critically depends on the price of the token. If the 
token price is sufficiently low, compliance with a donation request increases relative to a 
simple donation situation. If the token price is rather high, compliance with a donation request 
does not significantly change relative to a simple donation situation.  
 
To the extent that the sale of a token simply signals an expected donation amount, one 
might  wonder  whether  influencing  compliance  rates  requires  an  exchange  at  all.  In  fact, 
providing people with an explicit low reference price in a simple donation setting might be 
enough to cause comparable results to the low priced token exchange in Study 1 and 2. By the 
same reasoning, similarly low compliance rates as in high-priced exchange conditions may be 
obtained when donation requests are accompanied by an explicit high reference price. These 
issues are addressed in our third study.  
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1.4.1 Method 
 
1.4.1.1 Participants and design 
 
A total of 196 undergraduates participated in this between-participants computerized 
questionnaire study. The questionnaire was part of one hour session of unrelated experiments 




 We  told  participants  we  were  investigating  their  donation  behavior.  The  general 
instruction read as follows: ‘To be able to adjust the annual donation drive of the Marketing 
Department,  we  want  some  feedback  concerning  your  donation  preferences.  You  will  be 
presented with ten different hypothetical situations. Please try to indicate for each situation 
whether you would donate or not.’ All scenarios explained that the Marketing Department 
each  year  organized  a  donation  drive  and  that  all  marketing  students  and  experimental 
participants were given the chance to make a donation as well; after an experimental session 
participants were supposedly approached to make a donation.  
 
Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  five  experimental  scenarios.  In  the 
simple donation scenarios, they were asked to indicate whether or not they would donate and 
if so, how much. In the low and high priced donation condition they were asked whether or 
not they would donate €0.50 or €3. In the low and high priced token condition they were 
asked whether or not they would donate in exchange for a € 0.50 or €3 token, respectively. 
All scenarios were repeated ten times, using ten different charities in all conditions and ten 
different  products  in  the  exchange  conditions.  The  pairing  of  charities  and  products  was 
randomized for each participant in the exchange conditions separately.   
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1.4.2 Results 
 
1.4.2.1 Compliance probability 
 
 We  conducted  a  logistic  regression  with  the  proportion  of  ‘yes’-responses  as  the 
criterion, and experimental condition (5 levels) as the predictor. A significant main effect of 
experimental  condition  was  obtained,  LR  χ²(4)  =  107.72,  p  <  .0001  (see  Table  3).  As 
expected, participants in the low priced conditions (donation & exchange) were more likely to 
comply than people in the high priced conditions, LR χ²(1) = 67.96, p < .0001, and than 
people in the simple donation baseline condition, LR χ²(1) = 65.83, p < .0001, respectively. 
As in Study 2, however, the frequency of compliance in the high priced conditions did not 
significantly differ from the simple donation baseline condition, LR χ²(1) < 2, n.s.  
 
Unexpectedly, the proportion of participants agreeing to offer money was greater in 
the priced donation conditions (low & high) than in the priced exchange conditions (low & 
high), LR χ²(1) = 14.71, p = .0001. Moreover, the compliance rate was significantly higher in 
the high priced donation condition than in the simple donation condition, LR χ²(1) = 7.59, p = 
.0059. The compliance  rate did not significantly differ between the high priced exchange 
condition and the simple donation condition, LR χ²(1) < 1, n.s. Finally, the difference between 
exchange and priced donations was comparable for a high (3.00 €) and low price (0.50€), LR 
χ²(1) < 1, n.s. 
 
 
Table 1.3      
Proportion of ‘Yes’-Responses as a Function of Experimental Condition 
            Simple Donation           Priced Donation        Priced Exchange 
  Baseline (M = €8.8) 
(n = 41) 
Low (€0.50) 
(n = 37) 
High (€3.00) 
(n = 40) 
Low (€0.50) 
(n = 38) 
High (€3.00) 
(n = 40) 
Donation rate  47%  75%  57%  67%  45% 
Total revenue 
given n = 100 
€413.6  €37.5  €171  €33.5  €135 
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1.4.2.2 Contribution revenues 
 
 In the current study, only in the simple donation condition, participants could decide 
on the amount they were willing to donate. As in Study 1, the large variance (SD = 11) of the 
donation  amount  in  the  simple  donation  condition  is  consistent  with  our  assumption  that 
potential  donors,  in  the  absence  of  an  anchor  (i.e.  an  exchange),  experience  problems  in 
determining  a  socially  acceptable  donation  amount.  Many  participants  presumably 
overestimate the ‘cost’ of donating (M = €8.8) and hence decide not to donate at all. The other 
four conditions exhibit fixed prices and participants could not alter this amount. Contrary to 
the  first  two  studies,  participants  received  no  instruction  that  any  amount  would  be 





The  data  support  our  hypothesis  that  bundling  simple  donations  with  fixed  prices 
would generate similar results as bundling donation requests with priced tokens. The presence 
of a small or large reference price in a simple donation setting can apparently fulfill the same 
‘anchoring’ function as the sale of a token. Moreover, our data show that ‘priced’ donation 
requests are met with an even higher compliance than the corresponding exchange conditions. 
Most counter-intuitive is the fact that the high priced donation request yields significantly 
greater probability of compliance than the simple donation condition. As for the high priced 
exchange request, we notice a small but insignificant drop in compliance compared to the 
simple donation setting. We assume therefore that it is not the high price in itself which seems 
to be responsible for the low compliance rate in the high priced exchange condition, but a 
high  price  in  exchange  for  a  near-worthless  token.  Rather  than  pure  economic  reasons, 
feelings of exploitation (Miller & Ratner, 1998) or the norm of self-interest may be part of the 
excuse for not donating in exchange for high priced tokens: ‘The postcard presumably is less 
expensive in the supermarket’. Bundles of simple donations and fixed prices possibly entail a 
smaller risk that potential donators feel exploited.  
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1.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Three studies support the idea that adding exchange to charity can provide potential 
donors  with  an  anchor  or  expected  donation  amount.  People  react  positively  to  donation 
requests that are framed as the sale of tokens, if the tokens signal a low anchor amount, a 
‘fair’ price. In a simple donation setting, people lack a reference price. In their attempt to 
estimate a socially acceptable donation amount, many overestimate the cost of giving and thus 
decide not to donate. Therefore, the offer of a token can signal a reference price or an anchor 
to which other donation amounts may be compared (Fraser et al., 1988). A ‘low’ socially 
acceptable anchor will urge people to donate as it signals a ‘fair’ price and leaves people 
feeling ‘trapped’ in a good deal. A ‘high’ socially unacceptable or too large an anchor, on the 
contrary, may inhibit people from donating.  
 
In our studies, we did not seek to investigate if and why tokens in general (with or 
without a reference price) would affect donation decisions. In that context, it should be noted 
that our studies were not designed to rule out the exchange fiction theory of Holmes et al. 
(2002),  which  states  that  adding  exchange  to  charity  provides  potential  donors  with  a 
‘psychological cover’ that enables them to act altruistically while still complying with the 
norm of self-interest. In fact, our first two studies are still in line with the theory of the norm 
of self-interest (Miller, 1999). Still, our anchoring explanation gives an additional account for 
why people react positively to the sale of tokens in a donation request. Moreover, Study 3 
shows that, as expected by our anchoring explanation, a donation request that explicitly asks 
for  a  low  amount  generates  more  compliance  than  a  simple  donation  request.  Just  as  an 
exchange can ‘help or hurt’ depending on its price, a combined use of simple donations and 
specified contribution amounts can similarly influence compliance rates. This finding cannot 
be accommodated by Holmes et al.’s exchange fiction theory. Nevertheless, our anchoring 
explanation is not incompatible with the Justice Motive Model of human motivation (Lerner, 
1986) that underlies the exchange fiction theory. The justice motive predicts that if people are 
given the opportunity to help innocent victims and if doing so will not threaten their own 
deserving, then people will be highly responsive. In other words, once people are reassured 
(for example by a low reference price) that their personal outcomes are not in jeopardy, it 
seems easy to induce them to donate.  
  25 
The reverse effects of reference price on compliance probability and contribution per 
contributor indicate that a lot of thought should be given to the reference price that is signaled 
in  order  to  optimize  total  revenue.  For  instance,  in  exchange  situations,  if  the  token  is 
perceived  as  being  ‘overpriced’,  people  may  be  inhibited  from  donating,  possibly  due  to 
feelings of exploitation or the norm of self-interest. A participant’s post experimental reaction 
demonstrates this: ‘This is very odd, I would rather just donate €3 than to buy a useless 
postcard!’ This is consistent with the observation that offering a product in exchange for a 
donation may activate self-serving motivations and ‘economic’ thoughts about the usefulness 
of the product; whereas simply asking for a donation could set in motion more social equity 
concerns (Van Dijk, 2003).  From practical point of view, in that sense, bundles of simple 
donations and fixed prices are perhaps the safest option. In those settings, people know that 
their money in its entirety would be given to the described charity whereas in the exchange 
setting  the  actual  cost  of  the  product  remains  somewhat  ambiguous.  The  transparency  in 
donation settings with specified prices may be the reason why priced donations work even 
better  than  the  offer  of  an  exchange  (see  Table  3).  Moreover,  in  donation  settings  with 
specified prices there is also no product cost that needs to be subtracted from overall revenue. 
In all, then, donation settings with specified prices may generate higher revenues than the sale 
of small products.  
 
Finally, we like to rule out that people donate more easily in exchange for a product 
compared to a simple donation setting out of reciprocity concerns. When there is reciprocity 
(Cialdini, 2001) you receive something first and then you feel obliged to donate something in 
return. For example, Falk (2004) found strong and systematic effects from including gifts in 
donation letters: The relative frequency of donations increased by 17 % when a small gift was 
included and by 75 % for a large gift.  In our experiments, however, you’re openly asked to 
donate in exchange of a product. The transaction is immediately proposed. This implies that a 
reciprocity explanation cannot account for our findings. Moreover, if reciprocity would be 
part of the process, we would at least have to find a significant difference between the simple 
donation condition and the no-value exchange condition, and this was never the case in our 
experiments.  
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1.6 CAVEATS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
 
The  first  limitation  of  our  research  is  that  two  of  our  three  studies  were  scenario 
studies  and  did  not  measure  real  behavior.  Nevertheless,  the  compliance  rate  (our  main 
dependent variable) is quite comparable across the three experiments. On the other hand, the 
mean  amount  donated  in  the  simple  donation  condition  was  substantially  higher  in  our 
scenario studies (Studies 1 & 3), than in our study that entailed real behavior (Study 2). This 
finding is consistent with the notion that people do not always have a perfect insight in how 
they would behave in certain situations (e.g., Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) and important to keep 
in mind when comparing the total revenues of the three experiments.   
 
A second limitation is that our participants were all college students. It is important to 
assess the validity of our findings across other populations. In any event, our results appear to 
be  stable  across  sexes.  Integrating  the  findings  of  Brockner  et  al.  (1984),  Cialdini  and 
Schroeder (1976), and Fraser et al. (1988), we note that the size of the anchor points may 
change over time due to inflation and are probably population dependent (e.g., dependent on 
income: students vs. businessmen). Accordingly, we suggest the €3-token condition might 
result in different compliance rates in another population and/or several years from now. In 
that sense, it would be worthwhile for charities to ‘know’ their different donor types to be 
able to segment the donor database according to the size of the anchor points influencing 
donors’ decisions. Additionally, the charity might even decide to cut or raise donation prices 
depending on the organization’s marketing strategy, for example reaching a critical mass of 
‘small’ donors or only a select group of ‘large’ donors. 
 
Third, it is possible that the application of charity related tokens, which the donor can 
use  to  ‘signal’  his  social  reliability  (e.g.,  an  HIV  ribbon  or  an  Amnesty  candle),  would 
generate different results. In this case reputation concerns might be involved in the donation 
decision (Milinski, Semmann & Krambeck, 2002).   
 
An interesting avenue for future research would be to test whether priced donation 
requests, compared to simple donation requests, can also improve response rates in a direct 
mail context. For example, although legitimizing small contributions significantly increased  
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the number of donations in a door-to-door charity drive (Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976), this 
technique failed to boost compliance rates in a direct mail fund-raising (DeJong & Oopik, 
1992). There is evidence that donations in a direct mail campaign can be strongly influenced 
by choosing appropriate quantities in the request (Desmet & Feinberg, 2002), but so far these 
appeal scales have not been tested against a simple donation setting. 
 
In  this  research,  the  charities  we  used  were  rather  major  and  well-known  in  the 
country. It would be interesting to investigate whether Sinha and Batra’s finding (1999) that 
consumers are more price conscious when they perceive price unfairness by national brands 
(which results in private label purchases), also holds for charities. If consumers are also more 
price  conscious  when  they  perceive  price  unfairness  by  national  charities,  well-known 
national  charities  would have  to  pay  extra  attention  when  determining  their  token  prices. 
Moreover,  local  charities  (e.g.,  local  basketball  team)  then  may  even  have  a  competitive 
advantage of using ‘higher’ prices before being perceived as ‘unfair’.   
 
Finally,  in  our  studies,  participants’  donation  decisions  were  influenced  by  an 
informative anchor and participants were probed to consider the anchor as a possible donation 
value. Future research should also explore whether similar results can be obtained by means 
of ‘basic anchoring’. Basic anchoring is the situation in which people’s judgments of a target 
are  influenced  by  a  numerical  anchor  that  is  completely  uninformative  (e.g.,  a  number 
generated by a wheel of fortune) and where people are not asked to consider the anchor as a 
possible target value (cf. Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996). Suppose, for example, 
that students before answering the donation request had just written down the price of a beer, 
which happens to be €1.50. Would this unrelated and uninformative small numerical anchor 
induce them to donate? Feinberg (1986), for example, found more people donating a larger 
amount when a credit card donation option (i.e. a ‘spending’ cue) was present. Feinberg’s 
finding may be explained by the fact that a credit card signals a large but unspecified amount, 
that is, a vague indication of an expected contribution that could not be perceived as lying 
‘outside’ the plausible range of acceptance.  




Each day people perform acts of altruism. To economists this phenomenon is difficult 
to explain: If people are all selfish utility maximizers, why should they make sacrifices for 
others? Several explanations have been proposed to address this question. These include the 
desire to experience a ‘warm glow’ (e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972), a need to view oneself as good 
and kind (Walster, Berschield & Walster, 1973), an aspiration to ‘do the right thing’ (Dawes 
& Thaler, 1988), a quest for moral satisfaction (Kahneman & Knetsch, 1992), or a signal of 
social reliability to  gain indirect reciprocity or  political reputation (Milinski et al., 2002). 
What these explanations all have in common is the underlying assumption that helping other 
people gives you something in return. This suggest that one way of thinking about charitable 
giving is to view potential donors as consumers seeking some return utility from donating 
money.  However,  because  they  are  already  buying  something  ‘immaterial’  (e.g.,  a  warm 
glow), perhaps we do not need to offer them an additional material good (e.g., a candle). 
Crucial in the marketing of donations is to make the transaction as smooth as possible. We 
should offer them an indication of a comfortable expected donation amount. In other words, 
we should just ‘name them a price’ as long as this is appropriate and fair.   
 
  




HUNGRY FOR MONEY 
THE DESIRE FOR CALORIC RESOURCES INCREASES  








This paper attempts to provide an evolutionary explanation for humans’ motivation to 
strive for money in present-day societies. We propose that people’s desire for money is an 
adaptation  of  their  desire  for  food.  In  three  studies  we  show  the  reciprocal  association 
between the incentive value of food and money. In Study 1, hungry participants were less 
likely to donate to charity than satiated participants. In Study 2, an olfactory food cue, known 
to  increase  the  desire  to  eat,  made  participants  offer  less  money  in  a  ‘give  some  game’ 
compared to participants in a room free of scent.  In Study 3, the respondents’ desire for 
money affected the amount of M&Ms eaten in a subsequent taste test, but only for dietary-
unrestrained participants.  
                                                 
2 This manuscript is adapted from Briers, B., Pandelaere, M., Dewitte, S., & Warlop, L. (in press). Hungry for 
money: The desire for caloric resources increases the desire for financial resources and vice versa. Psychological 
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Leuven (grant OT/03/07  to the third and fourth authors) , and from Belgian Science Policy (grant CP01/151 to 
the fourth author), and from Censydiam-Synovate is gratefully acknowledged.  
  




One of the strongest motivations for people living in modern societies is the desire to 
obtain money. The cultural dominance of money is striking: it has been adopted irresistibly by 
any  human  society  that  encountered  it  (Lea  &  Webley,  2005).  But  in  spite  of  the 
extraordinary power of money, for most of mankind’s history ‘resources’ have connoted food 
rather than money (Diamond, 1997). Collecting or producing enough food to survive has 
always been man’s main challenge. It seems reasonable then to consider a biological basis for 
our attraction to money.  
 
The canonical economic model assumes that the utility from money is indirect, and is 
only valued for the goods or services it can procure (e.g., Camerer, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 
2005). In psychological terminology, standard economics considers money as a conditioned 
reinforcer.  While  food  is  generally  considered  as  a  primary  reinforcer,  money  can  be 
consumed only indirectly. As a consequence, standard economics views the desire for food 
and  the  desire  to  obtain money  as  two  different strivings.  The  relationship  between  both 
reinforcers must be asymmetric: money can buy food, but food cannot buy money. However, 
some neurological evidence suggests that the relationship between money and food might be 
more entwined than most economists would predict.  Breiter, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, and 
Shizgal (2001) found that the orbitofrontal cortex is activated by monetary rewards, whereas 
O’Doherty,  Deichmann, Critchley,  and  Dolan  (2002)  found  the  orbitofrontal  cortex  to  be 
activated by the consumption and anticipation of sweet-tasting food rewards.  The overlap in 
neural activation suggests a common pathway to the processing of money and food rewards, 
which may have major implications for the standard economical perspective on the utility for 
money.  
 
Some behavioral evidence is consistent with the proposed tangled relation between 
financial and caloric resources. Nelson and Morrison (2005) found that men who either feel 
poor or hungry prefer heavier women than men who feel rich or satiated. The authors suggest 
that preference for women’s body weight is determined by people’s individual experience of 
resource scarcity. This is consistent with the finding that in cultures with scarce resources, 
heavier women are preferred to slim women (e.g., Pettijohn & Jungeberg, 2004; Symons,  
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1979).  As  male  financial  and  caloric  deprivation  appears  both  related  to  perceived  ideal 
female  body  weight,  we  suggest  that  cues  signaling  scarcity  in  one  domain  might  also 
motivate people to acquire or maintain resources in the other domain.  Thus, we claim that 
people are less likely to sacrifice money when they desire food and eat more when they desire 
money. Three studies tested this hypothesis. 
 
1.2 STUDY 1 
 
 
Study 1 aimed to show that hunger affects donation behavior. We manipulated hunger 
and measured participants’ willingness to donate to charity. If deprivation of one of these 





Eighty-eight undergraduates (80 men) participated in exchange for course credit. They 
had been asked not to eat within four hours before the study and not to drink anything but tea, 
coffee or water. Eighteen participants failed to comply and were excluded. The remaining 
participants received a donation scenario and a taste test. In the hunger condition, the donation 
scenario preceded the taste test. In the satiated condition, the order was reversed.  
 
We  told  participants  that  the  Marketing  Department  organized  an  annual  donation 
drive and that students would be given the chance to make a donation. The alleged aim of the 
present study was to investigate which good cause students preferred. The general instruction 
read  as  follows:  ‘To  allow  us  to  adjust  the  annual  donation  drive  of  the  Marketing 
Department,  we  want  some  feedback  concerning  your  donation  preferences.  You  will  be 
presented with ten different hypothetical situations. Please indicate for each situation whether 
you would donate or not.’ The scenario was repeated ten times, using ten different charities.  
 
During  the  taste  test,  participants  had  to  eat  a  big  piece  of  cake.  The  taste  test 
consisted of twenty questions about taste,  color, structure and healthiness of the cake.  In  
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satiated condition, participants subsequently completed filler tasks before the donation task to 




After removing four participants who had not completed the questionnaire properly, a 
repeated  logistic  regression  on  the  participants’  10  binary  choices  with  the  experimental 
condition as the predictor revealed that hungry participants were less likely to donate (mean 
donation probability = .36) than satiated participants (mean donation probability = .44), LR 
χ²(1) = 4.64, prep = .906, log(OR) = .35. That is, hunger makes people hold on to their money 
more. 
 
1.3 STUDY 2 
 
 
In Study 1, satiated participants may have felt obligated to return something for the 
cake. To rule out reciprocity as an alternative explanation, we manipulated the desire to eat 
food by means of an olfactory food cue in Study 2. Participants had to play a ‘give some 
game’ in a room that either was or was not scented with freshly baked brownies. Exposure to 
an olfactory food cue is known to increase craving, liking, and the desire to eat the cued food 




Fifty-eight undergraduates (all women) participated for course credit. All participants 
had eaten during the four hours before the experiment.  Time since last meal was recorded to 
control for non-experimental variation in hunger. In the scent condition (n = 32), the scent of 
baking  brownies  wafted  into  the  laboratory  when  participants  entered.  In  the  control 
condition,  no  scent  was  present  in  the  lab  (n  =  26).  The  scent  manipulation  was 
counterbalanced with time of the day.  
 
Next, participants played a computerized ‘give some game’. They were allocated 10 
Euro  coins,  which  they  could  either  keep  or  donate  to  their  opponent,  who  would  
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simultaneously  make  the  same  decision.  Each  coin  kept  was  added  to  the  participant’s 
account; each coin donated was doubled by the experimenter and added to the opponent’s 
account.  To  make  the  procedure  consequential,  the  experimenter  announced  that  five 




An ANOVA with number of coins donated as the dependent variable, scent presence 
as  the  independent  variable  and  time-since-last-meal  as  a  control  variable  revealed  that 
participants in the scent condition gave fewer coins to their opponent compared to participants 
in the control condition, Mscent = 2.7, Mcontrol = 3.9; F(1, 55) = 4.18 , prep = .883, ηp2 = .071. 
There was no effect of time-since-last-meal, F(1, 55) = 2.80 , n.s.  
 
1.4 STUDY 3 
 
 
Studies 1 and 2 suggest that the desire for food makes people more likely to hold on to 
their money. In Study 3, we tested the inverse relationship. We manipulated participant’s 
‘desire for money’ by inducing lottery-winning fantasies. If hunger and ‘desire for money’ 
may influence one another, ‘desire for money’ should affect the amount of food eaten in a 
subsequent taste test. We further expect that food restriction goals will attenuate this effect. 
Additionally, we controlled for mood because bad mood enhances food consumption (e.g., 




Sixty-two undergraduates (20 men and 42 women) participated for an endowment of 
€7. Half the respondents had to imagine winning €25 000 on the lottery (high-desire-for-
money condition) whereas the other half had to imagine winning €25 (low-desire-for-money 
condition). All participants were instructed to make a list of all things they would dream of 
buying if they would win the specified amount.  
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We had pretested this lottery manipulation relying on Bruner and Goodman’s finding 
(1947) that the value of money interferes with normal perceptual processing. Since people 
with a high desire for money (e.g., poor children) overestimate the size of coins relatively to 
people with a low(er) desire for money (e.g., rich children), we hypothesized that participants 
in the €25.000-condition would estimate the size of euro coins larger than participants in the 
€25-condition.  After  listing  what  they  would  buy,  38  pretest  participants  were  asked  to 
identify the actual coin size among a set of seven coin sizes (ranging from 92.5% to 107.5% 
of the actual size; with option ‘4’ being the true coin size) for five coins (€0.10, €0.20, €0.50, 
€1,  and  €2).  The  average  estimated  coin  size  was  larger  in  the  high-desire-for-money 
condition than in the low-desire-for-money  condition, Mhigh-desire = 3.50, Mlow-desire = 2.99, 
t(36) = 2.04, p = .049, ηp2 = .10.  
 
In the actual experiment, after the lottery scenario, participants’ mood was measured 
using  the  PANAS  (Watson,  Clark,  &  Tellegen,  1988).  Subsequently,  participants  were 
instructed to complete the taste test. They were given two bowls of the same volume, one with 
regular M&Ms (400 grams), and the other with the ‘new’ crispy M&Ms (300 grams). They 
were  told  that  they  were  participating  in  a  comparative  taste  test  of  M&Ms.  They  were 
allowed to eat as many M&Ms as necessary to evaluate them on several dimensions (e.g., ‘are 
they crunchy?’). Quantity consumed was unobtrusively measured. Participants then received 
the  ‘Dutch  questionnaire  of  Eating  Behavior’  (van  Strien,  Frijters,  Bergers,  and  Defares, 
1986), which measures to what extent people restrain their food intake in order to loose, or 
not  to  gain,  weight.      Participants  were  classified  as  restrained  when  their  score  on  the 




An  ANOVA  with  desire-for-money  and  restraint  as  the  independent  variables  and 
time since participants’ last meal and gender as control variables, revealed a significant main 
effect  of  desire-for-money,  F(1,  56)  =  7.07,  prep  =  .95,  ηp2  =  .11.  The  main  effect  was 
qualified by an interaction with restraint, F(1, 56) = 3.98, prep = .8778, ηp2 = .066. Planned 
comparisons revealed that the unrestrained respondents ate more M&Ms in the high-desire-
for-money condition than the low-desire-for-money condition, Mhigh-desire = 38 grams, Mlow-
desire = 18 grams; F(1, 32) = 8.47, prep = .96, ηp2 = .21. For the restrained respondents, the  
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money manipulation did not affect the amount consumed, Mhigh-desire = 23 grams, Mlow-desire = 
21 grams; F(1, 22) < 1 , n.s. In addition, male respondents ate more than females, F(1, 56) = 
5.61, prep = .927, ηp2 = .091, and consumption decreased with increasing time since the last 
meal, F(1, 56) = 4.87, prep = .908, ηp2 = .080. Probably respondents did not want to spoil their 
appetite before an upcoming meal.  
 
The effects of ‘desire for money’ were not mediated by mood. First of all, the ‘desire 
for money’ manipulation influenced neither positive mood [α = .77; F(1, 60) < 1, n.s.] nor 
negative mood [α = .81; F(1, 60) < 1, n.s]. Second, neither positive mood [F(1, 60) < 1, n.s] 
nor negative mood [F(1, 60) < 1, n.s] affected the amount of M&Ms consumed. 
 
1.5 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
Three studies show a symmetric association between the incentive value of food and 
money. In Study 1, hungry participants were less likely to donate to charity than satiated 
participants. In Study 2, an olfactory food cue, known to increase the desire to eat, made 
participants offer less money in a ‘give some game’ compared to participants in a room free 
of scent. In Study 3, the respondents’ desire for money affected the amount of M&Ms eaten in 
a subsequent taste test, but only for unrestrained participants. We propose that people’s desire 
for money relies on human’s adaptation to collect food. 
 
To our knowledge we are the first to test the psychological link between money and 
food empirically. According to Gurven (2002), evolutionary psychologists and economists 
should be careful in generalizing their findings from monetary economic games to non-market 
situations and in drawing conclusions about the evolutionary origins of cooperation based 
upon monetary lab experiments. Part of our contribution therefore exists in providing support 
to  evolutionary  psychologists’  assumption  that  findings  involving  money  are  informative 
about  findings  involving  food  and  vice  versa.  Our  results  may  further  provide  a  partial 
explanation for Nelson and Morrison’s (2005) finding that financial and caloric deprivation 
appears both related to perceived ideal female body weight. The preference of lower income 
men for heavier women, as well as the acceptability of a larger body size for lower income  
  36 
women for example, might be interesting social phenomena that can be well predicted from 
our findings.  
 
An avenue for future research is to investigate the overlap in neurological activation 
due to ‘desire for money’ on the one hand, and to ‘desire for food’ on the other hand. The 
emerging evidence that both reward systems share a brain region (e.g., Breiter et al., 2001; 
O’Doherty et al., 2002) might suggest that this region is involved in the processing of all 
kinds of rewards (Montague & Berns, 2002; Wilson & Daly, 2004). For example, neural 
evidence suggests that the same dopaminergic reward circuitry of the brain in the midbrain is 
activated for a wide variety of different reinforcers, including attractive faces (Aharon et al., 
2001), funny cartoons (Mobbs et al., 2003), cultural objects like sports cars (Erk et al., 2002), 
drugs (Schultz, 2002), and money (Breiter et al., 2001).  
 
The  idea  that  many  rewards  are  processed  similarly  in  the  brain  has  important 
implications for economics, which assumes that the marginal utility of money depends on 
what money buys. Our findings suggest that money becomes a ‘primary reinforcer,’ which 
means that people value money without carefully computing what they plan to buy with it. 
The emerging area of neuroeconomics suggests the possibility that the value of money is only 
loosely  linked  to  consumption  utility  (Camerer  et  al.,  2005).  This  possibility  is  further 
supported by the noteworthy parallels between research on money and food. The tool theory 
of money (Lea & Webley, in press) and the set-point assumption of food (Pinel, Assanand, & 
Lehman, 2000) have in common that they consider money or food as instrumental: money as 
a means to obtain biologically relevant incentives and food as a means to prevent the body’s 
energy  resources  to  fall  below  an  energy  set-point.  However,  several  findings  were 
inconsistent with both instrumental theories. Bruner and Goodman (1947) found that children 
overestimate the size of coins relative to other stimuli, so people’s value of money apparently 
interferes with their normal perception of it. Likewise, people do not only eat to restore their 
energy level, but because of the anticipated pleasure of eating. The more recently advanced 
drug theory of money (Lea & Webley, in press) and positive-incentive theory of food (Pinel et 
al., 2000), share the view that money and food have value beyond their instrumentality and 
can account for those findings.  
 
Finally, the entwined association between food and money may help us understand 
why especially poor people are more vulnerable to overeating and suffer ill health as a result.  
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In industrialized countries such as the USA (Drewnowsky & Specter, 2004) as well as in 
developing countries (James, 2004), obesity is usually associated with poverty. Perhaps in 
present-day  societies  the  attraction  to  money  is  so  powerful  that  people  who,  relatively 
speaking, fail in their quest for (more) money become frustrated. Accordingly, as financial 
and caloric resources are exchangeable, they might tend to appease their desire for money by 
consuming more calories than is healthy.  
 
  




BETTER THINK BEFORE AGREEING TWICE 









This research demonstrates that triggering agreement from respondents increases their 
willingness to help the interviewer afterwards. We show that this effect (1) is mediated by 
perceived similarity with the interviewer, (2) is primarily the result of mindless processing, 
and (3) also holds in a real life marketing research telephone survey.   
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For  most  of  us,  few  days  pass  without  encountering  someone  who  solicits  our 
cooperation to respond to a questionnaire, to sample a product, to visit a website, or to donate 
to a humanitarian organization. For decades, researchers have been focusing on tools that 
boost compliance rates in this type of situations, both in marketing (e.g., Tybout, 1978; Fern, 
Monroe, & Avila, 1986; Hornik, 1992; Deutskens, De Ruyter, Wetzels, & Oosterveld, 2004) 
and in social psychology (e.g., Freedman & Fraser, 1966; Hornik, 1987; Nannberg & Hansen, 
1994; Burger, Messian, Patel, Prado, & Anderson, 2004). Whereas seminal studies focused on 
persuasion through explicit social forces that were well within conscious awareness (e.g., 
Asch,  1965;  Milgram,  1964),  recent  studies  have  focused  on  influence  processes  that  are 
subtle, indirect, or unconscious (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The present paper extends this 
latter line of research.  
 
In four studies we investigate whether triggering agreement from interviewees makes 
them more willing to help their interviewer afterwards. We start by discussing the literature 
on mere agreeing propositions as a positive testing tool with social utility value. Next, we 
elaborate on the underlying process through which agreement might influence subsequent 
compliance:  We  look  at  perceived  similarity  as  a  mediating  factor  and  propose  that  the 
influence  of  mere  agreeing  on  cooperation  is  largely  driven  by  heuristic  processing.  The 
contribution of this paper is threefold: we show (1) that mere agreeing increases compliance 
with a subsequent request for help, (2) that perceived similarity is the mechanism underlying 
this causal process and that this process is largely heuristic, and (3) that the mechanism also 
holds  in  a  real  life  marketing  research  context.  In  sum,  we  present  marketers  and  policy 
makers in search with a new compliance increasing tool, which has proven its robustness 
across different circumstances.  
 
1.1.1 The Social Value of Positive Testing 
  
Hypothesis-consistent testing or positive testing is the tendency to select questions that 
match your initial ideas or expectations about a person (e.g., Davies, 1997). For example, 
when people evaluate the hypothesis that someone is introverted, they ask questions like ‘Do  
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you  like  to  be  on  your  own?,’  which  elicit  an  affirmative  answer  if  the  respondent  is 
introverted (Zuckerman, Knee, Hodgins, & Miyake, 1995).  
 
Positive testing has traditionally been considered as an inaccurate way of collecting 
information.  To test a hypothesis people should look for disconfirmation, rather than for 
confirmation (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Wason, 1960). However, in a social interaction, positive 
testing may be more appropriate (cf. Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, 1998). Indeed, while trying 
to form an accurate perception of their interaction partners, people may also pursue the goal 
of getting along with them, not only during common encounters (e.g., Chartrand & Bargh, 
1999) but also during an interview (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Shadron, 1994). Correspondingly, 
several  studies  (e.g.,  Dardenne  &  Leyens,  1995;  Leyens  et  al.,  1998)  highlighted  the 
pragmatic function of positive testing during an interview.  
 
Consistent  with  this  pragmatic  approach  to  positive  testing,  research  showed  that 
asking hypothesis-consistent questions can be rewarding and entail some social value (see 
Leyens,  Dardenne,  Yzerbyt,  Scaillet,  &  Snyder,  1999).  Leyens  (1989)  showed  that  the 
questions that interviewers produce are more hypothesis-consistent when they interact with an 
interviewee  than  when  they  only  prepare  questions  for  a  future  interview.    Hypothesis-
consistent questions are also more frequent at the beginning of an interview than at the end. 
He proposes that hypothesis-consistent questions have social value in that they smoothen the 
interview. Indeed, when the context stresses the relevance of positive testing, for example 
when  interviewing  a  high-status  interviewee,  a  preference  for  questions  that  match  the 
hypothesis demonstrates a social skill (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995). In addition, Leyens et al. 
(1998) demonstrated that hypothesis-consistent questions were especially valuable when the 
interviewer’s goal was to display empathy, that is, when the interviewer was motivated to 
show that s/he was able to share in the other person’s feelings and beliefs. Finally, Pandelaere, 
Hoorens, and Peeters (2003) found that 77% of their participants engaged in positive testing 
when evaluating causal events. Pandelaere et al. (2003) even argued that the pervasiveness of 
the  positive  test  strategy  allows  interviewees  to  infer  what  hypothesis  the  interviewer 
entertains solely from the type of question s/he asks. 
 
In sum, several studies suggest that positive testing is a tool with social utility value. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, it has not been documented why that is the case and 
whether it could be used to boost compliance. We suggest that positive testing using mere  
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agreeing propositions facilitates the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee 
because it increases the interviewee’s perceived similarity with the interviewer. As a result, 
compliance with a request from the interviewer may increase.   
 
1.1.2 Mere Agreeing, Similarity, and Compliance 
 
We contend that triggering agreement from interviewees can cause them to think of 
themselves as holding attitudes similar to those of their interviewer. In the present series of 
studies, we will test this prediction. Particularly, we think that ‘agreeing’ respondents may 
perceive  the  interviewer  as  being  more  similar  to  them  than  ‘disagreeing’  or  ‘neutral’ 
respondents.  Furthermore,  we  expect  to  find  a  spillover  of  this  ‘similarity’  effect  to  the 
interviewees’ willingness to help the interviewer subsequently.  
 
As mentioned earlier, predicting other people’s behavior, attitudes, and preferences 
helps us to behave in an appropriate manner in social circumstances. The dominant view has 
been that people tend to give too much weight to their own attitudes in predicting others’. The 
phenomenon of assuming that others behave and believe like oneself has been studied in 
numerous  settings  and  hence  a  variety  of  terms  have  been  used  to  describe  it,  such  as 
attributive  projection  (e.g.,  Holmes,  1968  ),  assumed  similarity  (e.g.,  Cronbach,  1955), 
egocentric attribution (e.g., Heider, 1958 ), a lack of empathy in developmental research (e.g., 
Flavell, 1985), and false-consensus effect (e.g., Ross, Greene, & House, 1977). As a result, 
when  encountering  an  unknown  person,  people  tend  to  assume  relatively  high  levels  of 
similarity between that person and themselves, until clear evidence proves the opposite. In 
concert, the assumption that other people (such as an unknown interviewer) are highly similar 
and interviewees’ assumed tendency to use the questions as indicative of the interviewer’s 
attitudes,  it  seems  likely  that  positive  testing  will  boost  perceived  similarity  with  the 
interviewer. Hence, we hypothesize that ‘agreeing’ respondents may perceive an unknown 
interviewer as being more similar to them than ‘disagreeing’ or ‘neutral’ respondents. 
 
Next,  it  is  widely  accepted  that  perceived  similarity  with  a  requester  can  lead  to 
increased compliance. For instance, a subtle means by which requesters utilize the similarity 
principle for maximal influence is to dress in a manner similar to their targets’ (Emswiller, 
Deaux, & Willits, 1971). In marketing interactions, perceived similarity between buyers and  
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sellers has proven to result in greater likelihood of purchase (Woodside & Davenport, 1974), 
in more cooperation (Mathews, Wilson, & Monoky, 1972) and altruism (Deutsch & Kotik, 
1978). Even when the apparent similarities are based on superficial matches such as shared 
names, birthdays, or fingerprint types (Burger et al., 2004), they are capable of increasing 
compliance rates.  
 
Compliance with a request from someone with whom we share a birthday or with 
whom we agree is, however, not more rational or justifiable than compliance with a request 
from  someone  with  a  different  birthday  or  with  whom  we  disagree.  Thus,  a  thoughtful 
consideration  of  the  help  request  should  produce  similar  compliance  rates  between  the 
experimental (e.g., agreeing) and control conditions.  However, because participants often 
respond to requests with heuristic processing, they might react as if the request comes from a 
friend  or  acquaintance  (Burger  et  al.,  2004).  That  is,  heuristic  processing  can  lead  to  an 
increase in compliance when salient cues (e.g., same birthday or same attitudes) indicate this 
is the kind of person we usually say ‘yes’ to or the type of cause we usually support. 
 
1.1.3 Mindless Processing and Corrective Influence  
 
If  the  increased  compliance  that  we  hypothesize  in  these  studies  is  the  result  of 
heuristic processing, it implies that the awareness of this influence should reduce the relation 
between mere agreeing and compliance. Whether or not the influence of mere agreeing on 
compliance  is  heuristic,  has  important  practical  implications:  Because  consumers  possess 
persuasion knowledge and easily draw inferences about marketers’ ulterior motives and goals 
(Friestad & Wright, 1994), the technique we propose should be carefully crafted to avoid 
suspicion. Therefore, one of the goals of this paper is to examine whether the ‘mere agreeing’ 
effect on compliance is the result of mindless, as opposed to elaborative, processing. If mere 
agreeing triggers compliance through the use of a heuristic, efforts to debias the effect should 
lead  respondents  to  correct  for  this  influence.  On  the  other  hand,  if  mere  agreeing  on 
propositions changes cooperative behavior through an elaborative mechanism, then debiasing 
techniques, such as notifying the respondent of the fact that s/he agreed often, may leave the 
effect unaffected or even boost it.  
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Both in marketing and social psychology several lines of research demonstrate that 
directing people’s attention towards a source influencing their judgment leads to a correction 
of that judgment. For instance, like in most priming studies, Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kübler 
and Wänke (1993) found that trait judgments based on ambiguous behavior were assimilated 
toward the primed trait categories, however, this was only the case if participants’ attention 
was not directed towards the primes. In fact, if participants were reminded of the priming 
episode,  contrast  effects  were  obtained  (see  also  Lombardi,  Higgins,  &  Bargh,  1987).  A 
marketing  example  can  be  found  in  the  work  of  Shiv,  Carmon  and  Ariely  (2005).  They 
documented the placebo effect of price promotions, which illustrates that consumers who are 
paying a discounted price for a product can end up deriving a smaller subjective benefit from 
the product. They succeeded to ‘debias’ the placebo-effect of price promotions by reminding 
participants of the discounted price. More examples of similar attenuation effects are found 
for the false-fame effect (Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989), the mere-exposure effect 
(Bornstein  &  D’Agostino,  1992),  the  influence  of  mood  on  funniness  ratings  (Neumann, 
Seibt, & Strack, 2001), the activation of stereotypes (Lepore & Brown, 2002), and the mere-
measurement effect (Williams, Fitzsimons, & Block, 2004). In this study, we also apply the 
reminder procedure to investigate to what extent the mere agreeing effect on compliance is 
heuristic.  
 
1.1.4 Overview of Studies 
 
In four studies we show that the more participants agree on a set of propositions, the 
more  they  are  willing  to  help  ‘their  interviewer’  (i.e.  the  person  who  made  up  the 
propositions)  afterwards.  In  Study  1,  mere  agreeing  compared  to  mere  disagreeing  or 
responding  ‘neutrally’  enhanced  the  perceived  similarity  with  the  interviewer  in  the 
interviewee’s eyes. In Study 2, the effect on similarity mediated the mere agreeing effect on 
the interviewee’s cooperation with the interviewer. Study 3 showed that the mere agreeing 
effect is primarily the result of mindless, as opposed to effortful, processing: After being 
reminded of the number of times they agreed (i.e. debiasing tool), participants corrected for 
this influence. Finally, in Study 4 we tested the external validity of our findings. Particularly, 
we replicated the effect of mere agreeing on compliance in the setting of a market research 
telephone survey, using both a correlational and an experimental research methodology.  
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1.2 STUDY 1: THE EFFECT OF MERE AGREEING ON PERCEIVED SIMILARITY 
 
 
Study  1  aimed  to  show  that  mere  agreeing,  compared  to  mere  disagreeing  or 
responding neutrally, can cause people to believe that their ‘interviewer is more similar to 
them.  We  manipulated  the  extent  to  which  participants  agreed  or  disagreed  on  eight 





Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  three  experimental  conditions:  the 
agreeing,  the  disagreeing,  or  the  control  condition.  Pretests  found  that  overall  agreement 
differed  significantly  between  the  agreeing,  disagreeing,  and  control  condition.  In  the 
agreeing  condition,  participants  received  eight  propositions  with  respect  to  ecological 
behavior to which on average they would all agree (e.g., ‘I sometimes commute by bike rather 
than  by  car’).  In  the  disagreeing  condition,  participants  received  eight  propositions  with 
respect to ecological behavior to which on average they would all disagree (e.g., ‘I always use 
public transportation instead of my car’). In the control condition, participants received eight 
unrelated propositions to which on average they would all remain ‘neutral’ (e.g., ‘I read the 
newspaper every day’).  
 
Forty-seven subjects were invited to participate in a number of unrelated computerized 
experiments in exchange for course credit. Participants came to the laboratory in groups of 
maximum  eight  people  and  were  tested  in  individual  cubicles.  Upon  arrival  in  the  lab, 
participants had to indicate for each of the eight propositions, whether or not they agreed on a 
seven point scale (ranging from ‘I definitely do not agree’ to ‘I definitely agree’). Next, we 
looked at the extent to which participants associated or disassociated themselves with the 
person who made up the propositions. Participants were instructed to imagine the interviewer 
(i.e. the person who had made up the propositions) when answering the following three items 
on a seven point scale (Hafer, 2000): (1) ‘To what extent do you think the interviewer is like 
you’, (2) ‘To what extent do you think the interviewer and yourself share the same interests’, 
(3) Overall, how much do you identify with the interviewer’. As an additional indicator of  
  45 
perceived  similarity  we  also  included  a  psychological  measure  of  interpersonal  closeness 
(Aron, Aron, & Smollan, 1992). This measure of closeness uses seven pictures of two circles, 
one representing the self and the other representing the interviewer. The seven pictures differ 
with respect to the overlap between the two circles, ranging from no overlap to full overlap. 
We used the average of the three association items and the interpersonal closeness measure as 
a proxy for the perceived similarity between the participants and the interviewer (α = .88).  
 
1.2.2 Results and Discussion 
 
A manipulation check  confirmed that the overall agreement between the agreeing, 
neutral, and disagreeing condition, differed significantly in the predicted direction, Magreeing = 
5.7 > Mneutral = 4.2 > Mdisagreeing = 3.3; F(2,44) = 21.43; p < .0001.  Next, a one-way ANOVA 
of perceived similarity with three levels of the experimental condition (agreeing vs. control 
vs. disagreeing) revealed a main effect, F(2,44) = 5.96, p < .006. Participants in the agreeing 
condition perceived the interviewer as more similar than participants in the disagreeing (M = 
4.3 versus M = 3.0; t(1,30) = 3.4 ; p < .003) or the control condition (M = 4.3 versus M = 3.4; 
t(1,29)= 2.6 ; p < .02).  The disagreeing and the control condition did not significantly differ 
(M = 3.0 versus M = 3.4; t < 1; ns). The results suggest that agreeing participants perceive the 
interviewer as being more similar to them than disagreeing or neutral respondents 
   
1.3 STUDY 2: THE EFFECT OF MERE AGREEING ON COMPLIANCE 
 THROUGH PERCEIVED SIMILARITY  
 
 
We conducted Study 2 to investigate whether the effect of mere agreeing on similarity 
would spillover to the participants’ compliance with a subsequent request for help by the 
interviewer. Since in Study 1 the disagreeing and the control condition did not significantly 
differ, we decided to continue our research with only two conditions: the agreeing and the 
control condition.  
 
In our first study, the propositions in the control condition were unrelated to those we 
used in the agreeing and disagreeing conditions. For Study 2, therefore, we improved the 
control condition by using the same eight items as in the agreeing condition. However, the  
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control condition had to be ‘neutral’, so we reframed four (out of eight) agreeing items such 
that they were likely to trigger disagreement. Thus, the control condition consisted of four 
agreeing and four disagreeing items. Furthermore, in Study 2, we aimed to create a more 
‘incidental’  and  ‘irrelevant’  feeling  of  similarity  by  using  propositions  that  relate  to  all 
different kinds of topics (e.g., sports,  culture,  food, the weather …) rather than the eight 




Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  two  experimental  conditions:  the 
agreeing  or  the  control  condition.    As  in  Study 1,  in  the  agreeing  condition,  participants 
received eight propositions with a high probability of agreement (e.g., ‘I am happy when the 
weather  is  nice’  and  ‘As  a  child  I  usually  had  someone  to  look  up  to’).  In  the  control 
condition, participants received four items with a high probability of agreement (e.g., ‘I am 
happy when the weather is nice’) and four reframed items with a low probability of agreement 
(e.g.,  ‘As  a  child  I  never  had  someone  to  look  up  to’).  Pretests  indicated  that  overall 
agreement was significantly higher in the agreeing condition than in the control condition. 
 
Participants were invited to the lab in groups of maximum eight people to take part in 
a  series  of  unrelated  computerized  experiments.  Sixty-six  undergraduates  participated  in 
return for a participation fee. As in Study 1, upon entering the lab, participants had to indicate 
for each of the eight propositions, whether or not they agreed on a seven point scale (ranging 
from  ‘I  totally  don’t  agree’  to  ‘I  totally  agree’). After  a  filler  task,  the  participants  were 
instructed  to  imagine  a  scenario  in  which  the  ‘interviewer’  needed  some  help  for  his/her 
master’s thesis: Participants had to imagine being approached by this student interviewer who 
had constructed the eight propositions they had just judged. As a part of a larger personality 
research  the  interviewer  had  to  conduct  about  100  surveys  (15  item  questionnaire)  by 
telephone. In order to do that s/he was looking for volunteers to make some of the phone 
calls.  
 
Participants  could  indicate  on  a  visual  analogue  scale  with  endpoints  ‘few’  and 
‘many’, and midpoint ‘average’, how many phone calls they would be willing to make. Pre-
tests and prior research revealed that quantified pro-social intention measures are fraught with  
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noise. First, there is strong anchoring around numerical tags presented in a scale, which is an 
indication that many statements of value and belief are not directly retrieved from memory 
but rather are constructed online in response to a query (Chapman & Johnson, 1999). Second, 
because people have different norms of what is appropriate, a self-generated numeric value of 
their cooperation (e.g., the number of phone calls they intend to make) is unreliable (Briers, 
Pandelaere, & Warlop, 2006). We therefore deliberatively removed the exact number from the 
measure and included a tag reflecting the average number of phone calls people were willing 
to make in ‘prior’ studies (see e.g., Nelson & Norton, 2004). This provides participants with a 
clear norm, and they can indicate whether they intend to invest (1) as much or more than other 
people on the one hand or (0) less than others on the other hand. We used this dichotomous 
measure in the analysis.  
 
After the cooperation measure, we again administered the same perceived similarity 
scales as in Study 1. They allowed us to construct a proxy for the perceived similarity with the 
interviewer (α = .79). Next, because our manipulation might affect mood and because mood 
can have an effect on cooperative behavior (e.g., Berkowitz, 1987), we also measured mood 
using  the  PANAS  (Watson,  Clark,  &  Tellegen,  1988).  Finally,  participants  had  to  rate 
themselves  on  a  visual  analogue  scale  (80  points)  with  endpoints  ‘cooperative’  and 




After  removing  two  outliers
4  (Barnett  &  Toby,  1996),  we  conducted  a  logistic 
regression with the binary cooperation variable as the criterion, and experimental condition 
(agreeing vs. control) as the categorical predictor. We also controlled for negative mood, 
positive mood, and one’s disposition to cooperate.  
 
A manipulation check confirmed that the overall agreement between the agreeing and 
the neutral condition, differed significantly in the predicted direction, Magreeing = 5.9 > Mcontrol 
= 4.4; t(1, 62) = 12.26 , p < .0001. In line with our hypothesis, the probability of cooperation 
                                                 
4 Based on the extent to which participants (dis)agreed on the propositions and their answer on the ‘telephone’ 
scenario, a Mahalanobis distance was calculated for each participant to determine the outlying participants 
(Barnett & Toby, 1984). These Mahalanobis distances follow a Chi-Square distribution, in this case with 1 
degree of freedom. All participants with a distance higher than the .990 fractile were considered outliers. This 
led to the identification of 2 participants as outliers. We decided to drop these participants from the analysis.  
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was higher in the agreeing condition than in the control condition, Magreeing = 0.45, Mcontrol = 
0.22; LR χ²(1) = 4.27, p < .04. To provide evidence that the cooperation effect was mediated 
at least in part by the perceived similarity with the interviewer, we conducted a mediation 
analysis using the technique recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). First, in addition to 
the significant effect of the experimental condition on the willingness to cooperate in the 
telephone  scenario,  there  was  a  significant  effect  of  experimental  condition  on  perceived 
similarity with the interviewer, Magreeing = 4.1, Mcontrol = 3.6; F(1, 59) = 4.92 , p < .04. Second, 
perceived similarity and willingness to cooperate were positively related, LR χ²(1) = 9.42, p < 
.004. Finally, when both experimental condition and perceived similarity were entered as 
predictors in the equation, perceived similarity still predicted cooperation significantly, LR 
χ²(1)  =  6.92,  p  <  .009,  whereas  the  effect  of  experimental  condition  on  cooperation  was 
attenuated, LR χ²(1) < 2,  p > .18. Further, using a version of the Sobel test (Sobel, 1992) 
recommended by Baron and Kenny, the reduction in the direct effect of the experimental 
condition on cooperation, was significantly different from zero, 95% CI [-.2121 < Z < -.0041], 
providing support for mediation of perceived similarity.  
 
1.3.3 Discussion  
 
In summary, the second study shows that the effect of mere agreeing on perceived 
similarity spills over to the participants’ compliance with a subsequent request. Moreover, 
perceived  similarity  between  participants  and  interviewer  mediated  the  effect  of  mere 
agreeing on the interviewees’ willingness to help the interviewer afterwards.  
 
1.4 STUDY 3: THE EFFECT OF MERE AGREEING ON COMPLIANCE 
AS A RESULT OF MINDLESS PROCESSING  
 
 
In Study 3 we aimed to examine the mindless versus effortful nature of the underlying 
process responsible for the effect of mere agreeing on cooperation. To examine to what extent 
the process is mindless, we used the debiasing tool (e.g., Shiv et al., 2005). Specifically, we 
made  the  number  of  times  that  a  respondent  had  agreed  with  a  stranger  salient.  If  mere 
agreeing changes compliance through a mindful or elaborative mechanism, then debiasing 
should not attenuate the effect of agreeing on compliance, or may even increase the effect  
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size.  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  mechanism  is  largely  mindless,  then  debiasing  may  give 




One hundred and fifty participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions 
in a 2 (positive testing: agreeing versus control) X 2 (debiasing condition: debiasing versus no 
debiasing) between-subjects design. Apart from the debiasing manipulation, the procedure of 
Study 3 was identical to the one we used in Study 2.  
 
In the debiasing condition, prior to the telephone scenario, we showed participants an 
overview of their answers on the eight propositions. For example, if a person in the agreeing 
condition  previously  agreed  on  6  out  of  8  items,  the  computer  program  automatically 
generated a table with 6 times ‘I (definitely) agree’. In the no debiasing condition, like in 
Study 2, the telephone scenario immediately followed the eight propositions. If the effect of 
mere agreeing on compliance is the result of mindless processing, then reminding participants 




As  in  Study  2,  we  used  a  dichotomous  cooperation  measure  with  one  group  of 
participants (0) willing to make less phone calls than average, and one group participants (1) 
indicating to conduct as many or more phone calls than average. A manipulation check again 
showed  a  significant  difference  between  the  agreeing  and  the  control  condition  in  the 
predicted direction, Magreeing = 6.0 > Mcontrol = 4.3; t(1, 143) = 21.3 , p < .0001. After removing 
five  outliers
5,  we  conducted  a  logistic  regression  with  positive  testing  (agreeing  versus 
control) and debiasing condition (debiasing versus no debiasing) as the categorical predictors, 
and the binary cooperation variable as the criterion. Again we controlled for negative mood, 
positive mood, and one’s disposition to cooperate.  
The analysis revealed a significant interaction between positive testing and debiasing 
condition, LR χ²(1) = 4.22, p < .04 (Figure 1). Without debiasing, participants in the agreeing 
condition were more likely to cooperate than participants in the control condition, Magreeing = 
                                                 
5 The same procedure as in Study 2 was applied.   
  50 
0.42, Mcontrol = 0.22; LR χ²(1) = 4.17, p < .05, replicating Study 2. In the debiasing condition, 
however, the effect of agreeing on compliance disappeared, Magreeing = 0.29, Mcontrol = 0.33; 




STUDY 3: Means for the Probability to Make Phone Calls  
in the Agreeing and Control Condition for Debiasing or No Debiasing  















































In addition, when we included the interaction between perceived similarity (α = .81) 
and  debiasing  condition  in  the  equation,  we  found  a  marginally  significant  interaction 
between debiasing and the mediator, LR χ²(2) = 4.76, p < .10. Perceived similarity was not 
involved  when  we  showed  participants  an  overview  of  their  answers.  However,  when 
participants were not informed of their answers (like in Study 2), a mediation analysis (cf. 
Baron  &  Kenny,  1986)  indicated  that  perceived  similarity  mediated  the  effect  of  mere 
agreeing  on  subsequent  compliance.  In  particular,  the  following  three  conditions  for 
mediation were supported in the condition without debiasing (i.e. replicating Study 2): (1) the 
independent  variable  (agreeing  versus  control)  significantly  affected  the  mediator  (i.e. 
similarity), LR χ²(1) = 7.91, p < .007; (2) the independent variable (agreeing versus control) 
affected the dependent variable (likelihood to make phone calls), LR χ²(1) = 4.17, p < .05; (3) 
the mediator significantly affected the dependent variable, LR χ²(1) = 5.76, p < .02. Most 
importantly,  when  the  mediator  and  the  independent  variable  were  both  included  in  the  
  51 
analysis, the effect of perceived similarity on subsequent compliance remained, LR χ²(1) = 
3.60, p < .06, whereas the effect of mere agreeing on compliance was attenuated, LR χ²(1) < 2 
, p > .22. Once again, a Sobel test indicated that the reduction in the direct effect of mere 
agreeing on compliance, was significantly different from zero, 95% CI [-.3361 < Z < -.0052], 




Study 3 illustrates that the effect of mere agreeing on compliance is caused by rather 
mindless, as opposed to effortful, processing. Informing participants about the extent to which 
they previously agreed with an unknown other (i.e. debiasing), apparently makes them aware 
of the extraneous influence of mere agreeing and prompts them to correct for it.  Furthermore, 
among  the  participants  who  were  not  informed  of  the  number  of  ‘agreeing’  answers,  we 
replicated the findings of Study 2: perceived similarity between participants and interviewer 
mediated the effect of mere agreeing on the interviewees’ likelihood to help the interviewer 
afterwards.  
 
1.5 STUDY 4: REPLICATION IN THE FIELD 
 
 
The  fourth  study  was  conducted  to  test  the  ecological  validity  of  our  findings  in 
another  population  and  in  a  real  life  setting.  We  tested  the  effect  of  mere  agreeing  on 
compliance in a market research telephone survey. Particularly, we examined whether the 
level of agreeing on propositions would influence respondents’ willingness to subscribe for 
participation in future questionnaires. For the data collection, we collaborated with a local 
market  research  company.  In  a  correlational  study  (4a),  we  used  secondary  data  and 
investigated whether the level of agreement with propositions that were used as part of a 
larger  market  research  correlated  with  compliance.  In  the  experimental  study  (4b),  the 
compliance  and  the  setting  was  real  life,  but  we  manipulated  the  level  of  agreement  by 
varying the set propositions, just like we did in the previous lab studies.  
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Study 4a: a correlational study using real life questions 
        
A 1.5.1 Method 
 
The  first  study  was  a  correlational  study  on  secondary  data.    Its  purpose  was  to 
investigate the link between mere agreeing and compliance across another population outside 
the laboratory. Data were obtained from a local market research company that collected the 
data in 2005 for a well known publisher of newspapers. A representative (telephone) sample 
of  180  respondents  was  drawn  by  means  of  the  Last-Birthday  Method
6  (e.g.,  Oldendick, 
Bishop,  Sorenson,  &  Tuchfarber,  1988).  The  questionnaire  contained  40  multiple  choice 
items  that  explored  all  kinds  of  media  related  issues:  reading  habits,  media  interests, 
satisfaction …. Halfway the questionnaire, participants received five propositions with which 
they could (dis)agree on a five point scale. The propositions probed the new smaller format of 
the newspaper (e.g., ‘The new format encourages me to read more of the newspaper’ and ‘I do 
not  like  the  new  format,  I  prefer  the  old  one’).  At  the  end  of  the  survey,  after  the 
demographics, the interviewers asked for the participants’ willingness to cooperate in future 
surveys.   
   
A 1.5.2 Results and Discussion 
 
The  average  on  the  five  (dis)agree  propositions  turned  out  to  be  significantly 
positively correlated with the respondents’ willingness to leave their name and address for 
participation in future surveys (r = .15, p < .05).  In other words, the more participants agreed 
with the propositions on the new format, they  more likely they  were to comply  with the 
request. 
 
                                                 
6 This approach capitalizes on the fact that within households with multiple adults (i.e., more than one person 
who qualified to serve as a respondent), selecting one adult on the basis of which has the most recent birthday is 
a random process. 
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Study 4b: an experiment manipulating agreeing in a real life setting 
 
B 1.5.1 Method 
 
A  representative  sample  of  respondents  was  again  drawn  by  means  of  the  Last-
Birthday Method (Oldendick et al., 1988). Ninety-two participants were randomly assigned to 
one of two experimental conditions: the agreeing or the control condition. In order to have 
eight items in each experimental condition, we pretested 15 propositions (comparable to those 
of the previous studies) in both directions, agreeing and disagreeing. As in Study 2 and 3, the 
control condition consisted of four ‘agreeing’ and four ‘disagreeing’ items. For the actual 
experiment, it was vital for the experimental test that the interviewers read the computerized 
script  word  by  word,  so  we  decided  to  run  the  survey  with  two  rather  inexperienced 
interviewers (one of each gender).  
 
In a brief introduction, participants were told about the market research company and 
the purpose of the survey: Supposedly the market research company needed peoples’ opinion 
in order to adjust their upcoming services.  After participants gave their permission to respond 
to  the  questionnaire,  they  (1)  had  to  indicate  whether  or  not  they  agreed  on  the  eight 
propositions on a three point scale (agree = 1, neutral = 2, or disagree = 3), (2) were asked to 
give their name and address if they were willing to participate in comparable surveys in the 
future (i.e. cooperation measure), and (3) were asked for some demographics.   
 
B 1.5.2 Results 
 
A  manipulation  check  confirmed  the  significant  difference  between  the  level  of 
agreement in the agreeing and the control condition, Magreeing = 1.11 < Mcontrol = 1.98, t(1, 90) 
= 27,45; p < .0001. Next, a logistic regression with the binary cooperation variable as the 
criterion, and experimental condition (agreeing vs. control) and the interviewer (male versus 
female)  as  the  categorical  predictors,  revealed  a  positive  main  effect  of  the  experimental 
condition on the participants’ willingness to cooperate in future surveys, Magreeing = 37.5 %, 
Mcontrol = 31.8 %, β = 0.854, LR χ²(1) = 2.66, p = .05 (one-sided). We also found a main effect  
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of interviewer, LR χ²(1)  = 9.51, p < .005 (i.e. the effect of agreeing was larger for the male 
than  for  the  female  interviewer),  but  there  was  no  significant  interaction  between 




In  these  two  field  studies,  we  were  able  to  extend  the  validity  of  our  findings  to 
another population in a marketing research context. The final study in particular illustrates the 
potential impact of incorporating mere agreeing propositions in a real life telephone survey. 
 
1.6 GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
1.6.1 Review of key findings and theoretical implications 
 
Consistent  findings  across  four  studies  demonstrated  the  applicability  of  ‘mere 
agreeing’  propositions  as  a  subtle  compliance  increasing  tool.  In  Study  1,  we  found  that 
‘agreeing’ respondents perceived the interviewer or the person presenting the propositions as 
more similar to them than ‘disagreeing’ or ‘neutral’ respondents. Study 2 showed that the 
more participants agreed with a set of propositions, the more they were willing to help ‘their 
interviewer’ afterwards. This effect was mediated by the perceived similarity between the 
participants  and  the  interviewer.  Study  3  suggests  that  the  effect  of  mere  agreeing  on 
compliance is primarily the result of mindless processing: after notifying participants of the 
former  ‘mere  agreeing’  (i.e.  debiasing  tool)  the  effect  of  mere  agreeing  on  compliance 
disappeared. Finally, in Study 4, we tested the generalizibility of our findings. Particularly, we 
replicated  the  effect  of  mere  agreeing  on  the  willingness  to  cooperate  in  the  setting  of  a 
market research telephone survey.  
 
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to show that ‘agreeing with someone’ 
eventuates  in  the  assumption  that  this  person  resembles  you.  Next,  as  people  often 
automatically respond to similar others in a manner that parallels their responding to friends 
or acquaintances (Burger et al., 2004), the increased perceived similarity with the interviewer 
may be sufficient to make interviewees more compliant. Finally, we suggest that the effect of  
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mere agreeing influences cooperative behavior as the result of a well-learned script that is 
mindlessly applied when meeting ‘similar’ people. This finding complements to the literature 
on influence processes that are more subtle, indirect, and unconscious (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004). What is more, it contributes to a growing number of studies that find people typically 
responding  to  requests  by  relying  on  heuristic  information processing  (Chaiken  &  Trope, 
1999). 
 
1.6.2 Marketing implications 
 
 We like to introduce ‘mere agreeing’ with propositions as a novel tool that subtly 
increases  compliance  with  participation  requests.    In  a  telephone  survey  this  increased 
cooperation can lead to subscribing as a panel member; in a personal selling context this 
cooperation might contribute to an increased likelihood of agreeing with the sales pitch.  
 
As  positive  testing  appears  to  be  so  pervasive  and  ‘natural’  in  social  interactions 
(Pandelaere  et  al.,  2003),  we  stress  the  convenience  of  actually  using  positive  testing  in 
marketing interactions.  Next, since a rather basal mechanism through similarity proved to be 
driving the effect, we can assume it to be a rather robust strategy.  In fact, four consistent 
studies were able to show this robustness: The agreeing propositions worked equally well in a 
written (computerized) questionnaire among students, as in a real life telephone survey with 
respondents of all ages. Hence, we believe that this technique can be easily implemented in all 
circumstances  and  across  different  populations.  Moreover,  we  sense  that  mere  agreeing 
propositions are easy to assemble as they can question any opinion the respondents might 
have with respect to sports, politics, personality, lifestyle … or even the weather.  
 
From  a  social  utility  point  of  view,  ‘mere  agreeing’  may  smooth  the  interaction 
between the interviewer and an interviewee. In everyday life, people rarely form impressions 
of others as an end in itself; accuracy is seldom their only goal. Tetlock (1992) for example 
reminds us that what looks like errors and biases from a strictly rational point of view is often 
adaptive from a pragmatic perspective. Presumably, interviewers (e.g., marketers) will try to 
show interviewees (e.g., respondents) that they understand them and sympathize with them. 
Moreover, when the context stresses the relevance of hypothesis-consistent testing (e.g., when 
interviewing a high-status interviewee), a preference for questions that match the hypothesis  
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is a manifestation of a social skill (Dardenne & Leyens,, 1995). As the interview progresses, 
sufficient information about the personality is obtained and less concern for the smoothness of 
the interaction is needed. Hence, we propose that an interview has several goals, which may 
change  over  time.  As  interviewers  choose  fewer  and  fewer  matching  questions  as  the 
interview progresses (Leyens et al., 1998), we might predict that the applicability of mere 
agreeing propositions can be particularly important in the beginning of an interview (e.g., 
telephone survey) or personal selling context.    
 
One question for future research concerns the scope of the effect. It is possible that the 
more interviewees ‘learn’ about an interviewer, for instance trough visual appearance in a 
face-to-face interview, the less likely it is that mere agreeing will enhance their willingness to 
help the interviewer afterwards.  First, interviewees’ perceived similarity with the interviewer 
might then be based upon the actual perception they have with respect to the interviewer’s 
personality and looks, rather than upon the projection bias (e.g., Cronbach, 1955) and the 
extent  of  prior  agreement.  Second,  the  more  (visual)  contact  between  respondents  and 
interviewer, the more likely respondents are to infer that the interviewer has an evidentiary 
basis for his/her positive questions (Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner, 1982). Both predictions 
assume that the more respondents are ‘familiar’ with the interviewer, the less likely it is that 
prior agreement will lead to the assumption of attitude resemblance and thus, the less likely it 
is that prior agreement will lead to increased cooperation with the interviewer.  
 
Besides, as consumers’ persuasion knowledge is easily activated (Friestad & Wright, 
1994), we should carefully watch over the ‘subtlety’ of this technique. Specifically, since the 
increased  compliance  that  we  demonstrated  in  the  studies  presented  here,  is  the  result  of 
heuristic processing, any condition that triggers more systematic processing may reduce or 
eliminate the effect. Salient cues in the situation often can force us into a more thoughtful 
consideration of information (Macrae & Johnston, 1998). One possibility is the size of the 
request (Pollock, Smith, Knowles, & Bruce, 1998); that is, a request implying a large ‘effort’ 
or a high price might cause individuals to think about the request and the implications of 
saying  ‘yes’  and  thereby  pull  them  into  thoughtful  processing.  Next,  under  some 
circumstances  the  mere  agreeing  strategy  might  be  too  ‘obvious’  for  respondents.  For 
example, increasing the number of agreeing propositions (e.g., from 8 to 15), or using a very 
friendly  or  pushy  interviewer  to  begin  with,  might  cause  participants  to  detect  the  ‘mere 
agreeing’ technique, which then gives them the opportunity to (over)correct for the influence.  
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Just as the debiasing study illustrates, the more respondents become aware of the extraneous 
influence, the more the influence of mere agreeing on compliance should be attenuated.  
 
Finally, further research is needed to investigate how many agreeing propositions are 
exactly needed for the effect to occur, and whether the relation is curvilinear (decreasing 
marginal effects).  
 
  




In three different manuscripts we showed that compliance with a donation request or a 
request for help is (at least partly) the result of heuristic processing and that subtle cues (either 
internal or external) can be applied to affect consumers’ likelihood of making a ‘cooperative’ 
choice.  
 
In the first manuscript, we found support for the idea that adding exchange to charity 
can provide potential donors with an anchor or expected donation amount. People reacted 
positively  to  donation  requests  that  were  framed  as  the  sale  of  a  product,  if  the  product 
signaled a low anchor amount, a ‘fair’ price. In a simple donation setting, on the other hand, 
people lacked a reference price. In their attempt to estimate a socially acceptable donation 
amount, many overestimated the cost of giving and thus decided not to donate. With respect 
to our contribution to the field of social marketing, charitable organizations may improve their 
door-to-door soliciting strategies by offering their potential donors a reference price. Crucial 
in the marketing of fundraising is, apparently, to make the transaction as smooth as possible: 
We should provide potential donors with a cue of a comfortable expected donation amount 
and just ‘name them a price’.   
 
In the second paper, we propose that people’s desire for money is a modern derivative 
of their evolved desire for food. Three studies demonstrate a symmetric association between 
the incentive value of food and money. An internal hunger cue in Study 1 and an olfactory 
food  cue  in  Study  2,  both  increased  participants’  desire  for  money  (i.e.  decreased  the 
willingness to donate). In Study 3, the desire for money (lottery fantasies) influenced the 
amount of candy consumed in a subsequent taste test. In marketing interactions, common 
intuition  indeed  suggests  that  hungry  consumers  are  generally  less  cooperative.  Hence, 
depending on the power and the goals of each party, we should be careful to negotiate on an 
empty stomach. In fact, hungry consumers might be less likely to agree with a sales pitch or, 
in the context of fund raising, less inclined to donate money. Our findings indeed imply that 
we should not ask people to donate before an upcoming meal or at the entrance of a nice 
smelling bakery. 
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In  the  final  paper,  we  applied  the  social  and  interpersonal  value  of  hypothesis-
consistent  testing  (Dardenne  &  Leyens,  1995)  to  boost  compliance  rates  in  marketing 
interactions.  More  specifically,  consistent  findings  across  four  studies  demonstrated  the 
applicability  of  mere  agreeing  propositions  as  a  novel  tool  to  increase  compliance  with 
subsequent  requests  for  help.  The  increased  compliance  was  proven  to  be  caused  by  an 
increased perceived similarity between interviewer and interviewee (e.g., Burger et al., 2004). 
Further, we showed that ‘mere agreeing’ boosts compliance as the result of subtle and largely 
heuristic processing. Finally, we provided greater generalizibility for the effect by replicating 
our lab findings in a sample of the general population in a market research telephone survey. 
In  sum,  we  present  marketers  a  subtle  compliance  increasing  tool  that  has  proven  its 
robustness across different circumstances.  
 
Overall, the three manuscripts suggest that cooperative behavior might be more driven 
by heuristic processing than many social marketers (e.g. Andreasen, 1995) might assume. 
Apparently, heuristic processing can lead to an increase in compliance when subtle cues such 
as  a  reference  price  (Manuscript  I),  an  olfactory  food  cue  (Manuscript  II),  or  perceived 
similarity (Manuscript III), indicate that this is the type of donation amount we easily afford 
(Manuscript I), the kind of situation we should hold on to our money (Manuscript II), or the 
kind of person we usually say ‘yes’ to (Manuscript III).  
 
 Elaborating on these findings, it would be interesting to test whether the ‘prosocial’ 
option in our studies (e.g. donating money or helping the interviewer) represents the quick 
and easy, ‘automatic’ decision, whereas refusing to help may be the option that requires more 
cognitive resources. Van den Bos et al. (2006), however, found the exact opposite: people 
reacted in a more self-centered way to unfair arrangements when they had a lot on their 
minds.  Their  participants  were  more  satisfied  with  advantageous  inequity  when  cognitive 
processing was strongly, as opposed to weakly, limited. Van den Bos et al. (2006) argued that 
when reacting to arrangements of advantageous inequity, judging the advantage is quick and 
easy as preferences are primary, whereas adjusting this appraisal requires cognitive resources 
as it entails integrating fairness concerns with the initial preference appraisal. Related to our 
studies, further research is needed to explore whether participants’ primary preference is to 
comply with a request or not to comply. Additionally, we should investigate whether this  
  60 
primary preference is moderated by participants’ social value orientation
7. After all, it seems 
reasonable to assume that the primary choice of proselfs differs from the primary choice of 
prosocials. If that is the case, than social value orientation might function as a moderator in all 
our findings.  
 
In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter,  we  identify  some  more  suggestions  for  future 
research, which, to come full circle, we will categorize according to Fine’s 7P’s marketing 
model (1990) as described earlier in the introduction.   
 
Future Research I: Adding Exchange to Charity 
 
Placement. An opportunity for future research is to test the reference price explanation 
outside the lab setting. It is important to assess the validity of our findings in a real life 
donation setting. Furthermore, it would interesting to test whether priced donation requests, 
compared  to  simple  donation  requests,  can  also  improve  response  rates  in  a  direct  mail 
context. For example, although legitimizing small contributions significantly increased the 
number  of  donations  in  a  door-to-door  charity  drive  (Cialdini  &  Schroeder,  1976),  this 
technique failed to boost compliance rates in a direct mail fund-raising (DeJong & Oopik, 
1992). In addition, we already noted that the size of the reference anchor points may change 
over time due to inflation. 
 
Purchasers. More research is also needed to validate our findings in a population other 
than college students. For instance, the size of the anchor is likely to be consumer dependent 
(e.g., dependent on income: students vs. business men). In fact, we suggest that it might be 
worthwhile for charities to ‘know’ their targets and to segment the donor database according 
to consumer dependent anchor points. Additionally, the charity might decide to cut or raise 
donation prices depending on the organization’s marketing strategy, for example reaching a 
critical mass of ‘small’ donors or only a select group of ‘large’ donors.  
 
Producer. The size of the ‘fair’ reference price, which still lies within the range of 
acceptance, might of course also be dependent on the particular charity. We used rather major 
                                                 
7 Social Value Orientation is a dispositional variable defined as a particular preference for various own-other 
distributions (McClintock, 1972). 
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and well-known charities. Further research is needed to investigate whether Sinha and Batra’s 
finding (1999) that consumers are more price conscious when they perceive price unfairness 
by  national  brands  (which  results  in  private  label  purchases),  also  holds  for  charities.  If 
consumers are also more price conscious when they perceive price unfairness by national 
charities, well-known national charities would have to pay extra attention when determining 
their token prices. Moreover, local charities (e.g., local basketball team) then may even have a 
competitive advantage of using ‘higher’ prices before being perceived as ‘unfair’.   
 
Product. It is possible that framing the donation as the sale of a charity related token 
(e.g., a bumper sticker of the Red Cross) would generate different results. The donor, for 
instance, might use a charity related token to ‘signal’ his social responsibility. Contrary to our 
findings, in this case, a high priced exchange might yield better compliance rates than a high 
priced mere donation. After all, if offering a product in exchange for a donation activates self-
serving  motivations  and  thoughts  about  the  usefulness  of  the  product  (Van  Dijk,  2003), 
consumers  might  actually  perceive  the  bumper  sticker  as  an  object  with  a  high  self-
presentation utility value for which they might be willing to pay a high price. In fact, it would 
be interesting to test Van Dijk’s (2003) proposition directly. For instance, a lexical decision
8 
task might reveal that framing the donation request as the sale of a product compared to 
simply asking people to donate, (1) activates more self-serving motivations and economic 
thoughts about the usefulness of the product, and/or (2) triggers less social equity concerns. In 
addition, further research may try to uncover how individuals’ social value orientation
9 might 
moderate the activation of economic versus social equity concerns in both conditions (simple 
donation versus exchange). After all, in general, one might expect the activation of economic 
thought to be higher for pro-selfs than pro-socials and vice versa for the activation of social 
equity concerns.  
 
                                                 
8 A lexical decision task is a type of experiment in which subjects are presented, either visually or auditory, with 
a mixture of words and pseudowords. Their task is to indicate, usually with a button-press, whether the presented 
stimulus is a word or not. The analysis is based on the reaction times for the various conditions (e.g., mere 
donation or exchange) for which the words (or the pseudowords) differ (e.g., related to self-interest or social 
equity). One can draw theoretical inferences from differences like this. For instance, we might conclude that 
words related to social equity have a stronger mental activation in the mere donation condition than in the 
exchange condition.  
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Promotion. Finally, in our studies, participants’ donation decisions were influenced by 
an informative anchor (i.e. the reference price) and participants were probed to consider the 
anchor as a possible donation value. Future research could explore whether similar findings 
can be obtained by means of ‘basic anchoring’. Basic anchoring is the situation in which 
people’s  judgments  of  a  target  are  influenced  by  an  irrelevant  numerical  anchor  (e.g.,  a 
number generated by a wheel of fortune) and where people are not asked to consider the 
anchor as a possible target value (cf. Wilson, Houston, Etling & Brekke, 1996). Suppose, for 
example, that consumers before answering the donation request would be presented with an 
advertisement for a beer, of which the price happens to be €1.50. Would this unrelated and 
irrelevant  small  numerical  anchor  induce  them  to  donate?  Feinberg  (1986),  for  example, 
found  more  people  donating  a  larger  amount  when  a  credit  card  donation  option  (i.e.  a 
‘spending’ cue) was present.  
 
Future Research II: Hungry for Money 
 
Purchasers (1). A first limitation of this research is that we did not control for factors 
that  could  influence  the  food/money  relationship,  such  as  BMI  (Body  Mass  Index),  or 
financial status of the participants. Nevertheless, we believe that our consistent finding across 
three studies, even without controlling for BMI, suggests that the effect is rather robust. Note 
that our manipulations were subtle in comparison with rather stable characteristics such as 
income and BMI. We are aware of the fact that BMI might play a role in the effect of hunger 
on ‘desire for money’ and vice versa. For instance, Nisbett and Kanouse (1969) found that 
food deprivation differently affected obese and nonobese shoppers (see also Steinberg and 
Yalch  1978).  Normal  weight  shoppers  tended  to  purchase  more  when  deprived  than 
overweight shoppers. Perhaps, obese individuals are not that sensitive to internal hunger cues 
as  nonobese  individuals,  because  they  possess  more  caloric  resources.  Considering  our 
findings, we might predict the absence (or a smaller) of a hunger effect on the donation 
behavior of obese individuals. Further research is needed to address this question.  
 
Purchasers (2). According to Steinberg and Yalch (1978), free food sampling in a 
supermarket differently affected the subsequent purchases of obese and nonobese shoppers: 
After consumption of the food sample, the obese purchased more additional products than the 
nonobese.  Hence,  whereas  Nisbett  and  Kanouse  (1969)  found  obese  shoppers  to  be  less  
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sensitive to internal hunger cues than nonobese shoppers, Steinberg and Yach (1978) found 
obese shoppers to be more sensitive to the taste of food in a sample. To link Steinberg and 
Yach’s findings to our research on hunger and money, it would be interesting to investigate 
whether internal hunger cues on the one hand, and taste or olfactory food cues on the other 
hand, would affect the donation behavior of obese versus nonobese consumers differently. If 
obese individuals are less sensitive to internal food cues than nonobese individuals, we would 
expect hungry obese individuals to donate more money than hungry nonobese individuals (see 
supra). On the contrary, if the obese are more sensitive to taste or olfactory food cues than the 
nonobese, we would expect obese individuals to donate less money than nonobese individuals 
in a room that is scented with the smell of freshly baked brownies.  
 
Purchasers (3). In an exploratory study, we found that the effect of hunger on desire 
for money was moderated by intelligence (i.e. IQ). The effect of hunger on donation behavior 
was smaller for ‘high’ intelligent students than for ‘low’ intelligent students. There may be 
several possible explanations for why ‘high’ intelligent people are less sensitive to internal 
cues of hunger than ‘low’ intelligent people. First, ‘high’ intelligent hungry individuals might 
know  that  they  are  capable  of  collecting  enough  resources  in  the  future;  whereas  ‘low’ 
intelligent hungry individuals might remain uncertain as to how many resources they can 
gather and as a consequence not eager to donate to charity. Second, in the light of market 
signaling  of  personal  characteristics,  ‘high’  intelligent  hungry  people  might  donate  more 
money than ‘low’ intelligent hungry people out of self-presentation concerns. For example, 
the costly signaling theory states that individuals with a certain quality (such as high IQ) can 
signal their type by displaying unconditional altruism, like sharing money or food. Since the 
community members can learn that that individual is good for mating, or better avoided in 
competition, the altruistic individual is likely to be reimbursed with increased fitness during 
his  or  her  lifetime  (e.g.,  Gurven,  2002).  More  research  is  needed  to  explore  the  possible 
predictions.  
 
Future Research III: Better Think before Agreeing Twice 
 
Price. One question for future research concerns potential limits to the effect of mere 
agreeing on subsequent cooperation. Since the increased compliance we demonstrated in the 
manuscript, is the result of mindless processing, any condition that prompts more systematic  
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processing  may  reduce  or  eliminate  the  effect.  For  instance,  salient  cues  in  the  specific 
context  often  can  force  us  into  a  more  mindful  consideration  of  information  (Macrae  & 
Johnston, 1998).One possibility is the size of the request (Pollock, Smith, Knowles, & Bruce, 
1998);  that  is,  a  high  ‘price’  might  cause  individuals  to  think  about  the  request  and  the 
implications of saying ‘yes’ and thereby pull them into thoughtful processing. For example, 
asking respondents to participate in a weekly questionnaire might be too large a request, and 
thus, may activate mindful processing or ‘debias’ the effect as such.  
 
Placement (1). For the same reasons as mentioned above, we should carefully examine 
the subtlety of the mere agreeing tool. The ‘mindless’ nature of the effect, implies that the 
more respondents become aware of this extraneous influence, the more the influence of mere 
agreeing on cooperation should be attenuated. Consumers’ persuasion knowledge is expected 
to ‘hover in readiness’ to help in the formation of valid attitudes about an influence agent 
(Friestad & Wright, 1994, p. 10) and consumers use this knowledge to manage the persuasion 
attempt in achieving their own goals. So, we should avoid that mere agreement tool gets 
perceived as an overt persuasion attempt. For instance, one can imagine that the context of a 
door-to-door  sales  pitch  or  a  trade  fair  automatically  makes  people  highly  sensitive  for 
persuasion attempts, and thus, ‘rings a bell’ when they tend to agree on almost everything the 
(pushy) vendor puts forward. Further research is needed to address this question.  
 
Placement  (2).  Further  research  is  also  needed  to  explore  how  the  setting  of  the 
interview can affect the outcome of using mere agreement. As mentioned earlier, it is possible 
that the more interviewees ‘learn’ about an interviewer, for instance trough visual appearance 
in  a  face-to-face  interview,  the  less  likely  it  is  that  mere  agreeing  will  enhance  their 
willingness to help the interviewer afterwards. First, interviewees’ perceived similarity with 
the interviewer might then be based upon the actual perception they have with respect to the 
interviewer’s  personality  and  looks,  rather  than  to  be  driven  by  projection  bias  (e.g., 
Cronbach, 1955) and the extent of prior agreement. Second, the more (visual) contact between 
respondents and interviewer, the more likely respondents are to infer that the interviewer has 
an evidentiary basis for his/her positive questions (Swann, Giuliano, & Wegner 1982). Both 
predictions assume that  the more respondents are ‘familiar’  with the interviewer, the less 
likely it is that prior agreement will lead to the assumption of attitude resemblance and thus, 
the  less  likely  it  is  that  prior  agreement  will  lead  to  increased  cooperation  with  the 
interviewer. Further research is needed to address these questions.   
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Promotion. Finally, another avenue for future research would be to examine an even 
more abstract and basal way of ‘agreeing’, that is ‘nodding’. More specifically, it would be 
interesting to test whether overt vertical head movements towards an unknown other might 
increase subsequent cooperative behavior with this person. Head nodding, in comparison to 
head  shaking,  has  already  been  shown  to  elicit  positive  reactions  to  persuasion  attempts 
(Wells & Petty, 1980). Briñol and Petty (2003) explain these findings by means of a self-
validation  analysis  that  postulates  that  head  movements  either  enhance  (nodding)  or 
undermine (shaking) confidence in one’s pre-existing thoughts about the message. However, 
other research (e.g., Priester, Cacioppo, & Petty, 1996; Tom et al., 1991) has proven that 
vertical  head  movements  also  facilitate  the  production  of  favorable  thoughts  and  feelings 
towards  neutral  stimuli.  For  this  reason,  it  makes  sense  to  assume  that  vertical  head 
movements in the presence of an unknown other may evoke positive feelings towards this 
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